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ABSTRACT. California recently became the first state to ban licensed psychotherapists from
engaging in "sexual orientation change efforts" (SOCE) -also known as conversion therapy-
with a minor. This Note argues that, despite the legislation's laudable goals, California's
regulatory strategy may not necessarily offer the best model for other states seeking to limit
SOCE. California's approach is troubling for several reasons: it reinforces an essentializing
conception of sexual identity; it is particularly amenable to First Amendment challenges; and it
has the potential to generate political backlash by feeding into historically pervasive anti-gay
narratives. I suggest that an alternative approach would curtail SOCE therapists' influence using
existing state laws that forbid medical professionals from making deceptive promises about the
effectiveness of their services. As SOCE is widely considered to be ineffective, challenging SOCE
practitioners using state anti-deception law could potentially achieve results similar to those of a
full SOCE ban.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 2012, the California legislature passed Senate Bill 1172 (SB
1172), which prohibits licensed psychotherapists from engaging in "sexual
orientation change efforts" (SOCE) with minor patients.' This unprecedented
statute aims to prevent any mental health professional from using techniques -
commonly known as "conversion therapy" or "reparative therapy"-that
attempt to eliminate homosexual attraction or foster heterosexual attraction
when treating a minor patient.'
The passage of SB 1172 adds a new dimension to mainstream
psychotherapy's complicated relationship with sexual orientation. As many
scholars have pointed out, the majority of psychiatrists and psychologists once
believed that same-sex attraction could be "cured" through psychotherapeutic
intervention.3 However, since homosexuality was removed from the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1973,' the mainstream mental
health establishment' has come to view homosexuality and bisexuality as
benign, encouraging therapists to engage in practices that "affirm" a patient's
sexual orientation.6
At the same time, several groups7 have continued to insist that sexual
orientation can be changed through therapy.' These "ex-gay" organizations,
1. S.B. 1172, 2011-12 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 865-865.2
(West 2013)).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 31-49
(20o6); David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires: Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of
Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1297, 1303-11 (1999).
4. YOSHINO, supra note 3, at 41.
s. I use this term to refer to the viewpoints of mainstream psychological, psychiatric, and social
work organizations such as the American Psychological Association.
6. See, e.g., Practice Guidelines for LGB Clients, AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N, http://www.apa.org/pi
/lgbt/resources /guidelines.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
7. The National Association for Research & Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH) and Jews
Offering New Alternatives for Healing (JONAH, formerly known as Jews Offering New
Alternatives for Homosexuality), are two of the most well-known organizations that
espouse SOCE practices and offer SOCE services. For a list of known SOCE-sponsoring
organizations, see "Ex-Gay" Industry Snapshot, TRUTH WINS OUT, http://www.truthwinsout
.org/ex-gay -industry-snapshot (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).
8. See, e.g., Floyd Godfrey, Common Questions About SSA, JONAH, http://www.jonahweb
.org/sections.php?secld=204 (last visited Oct 24, 2013) ("There are many individuals who
have experienced permanent change in sexual orientation. Change is possible. . . . We have
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and therapists affiliated with them, continue to provide SOCE therapy and
often market these services to minors from religious communities.9 In the last
several years, the mental health establishment has become increasingly
concerned with these practices and has issued reports concluding that SOCE is
ineffective and potentially harmful.o Lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB") rights
organizations have also begun publicly documenting the stories of individual
patients subjected to SOCE practices, many of whom describe their treatments
as emotionally or sexually abusive."
The California legislature adopted SB 1172 in response to these new reports
of SOCE's potential harmfulness, pointing to the state's "compelling interest in
protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors . . . and in
protecting its minors against exposure to serious harms caused by sexual
orientation change efforts."" The legislation establishes that using SOCE
therapy on a minor is "unprofessional conduct," 4 which provides grounds for
a therapist to lose his license." LGB rights groups, especially Equality
California, were instrumental in galvanizing the state to act, and also framed
the legislation as part of a broader effort to "protect and empower" LGB
not seen anyone who cannot change . . . ."); Joseph Nicolosi, THOMAS AQUINAS PSYCHOL.
CLINIC, http://josephnicolosi.com (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (advertising psychological
services that promise to "[d]iminish your unwanted homosexuality").
9. See, e.g., Ethics Faith and Family Division, NARTH, http://www.narth.com/join-narth
#!family-faith-ethics2/cubg (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (linking to anti-LGB articles and
videos sponsored by Protestant and Catholic organizations); Religious Commentary, JONAH,
http://www.jonahweb.org/sections.php?secld=14 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (providing
"religious commentary" from various rabbis on why SOCE therapy is worthwhile).
lo. See infra Sections L.A-B.
ii. This Note generally uses the term "LGB," rather than the more common term "LGBT,"
since the legislation in question deals only with therapies used to "convert" lesbian, gay, and
bisexual individuals, not transgender people.
12. See, e.g., Conversion Therapy, S. POVERTY L. CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/conversion
-therapy (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (inviting former SOCE patients to share their stories);
Tell Your Story, TRUTH WINs OUT, http://www.truthwinsout.org/tell-your-story (last
visited Oct. 24, 2013) (publicizing the stories of former SOCE patients).
13. S.B. 1172 § 1(n), 2011-12 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
14. Id. 5 2(b)(2) (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 5 865 (West 2013)).
15. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 5 2960 ("The board may refuse to issue any registration or license,
or may issue a registration or license with terms and conditions, or may suspend or revoke
the registration or license of any registrant or licensee if the applicant, registrant, or licensee
has been guilty of unprofessional conduct.").
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youth."6 This strategy of seeking legislation that bans the use of SOCE therapy
on minors has now become appealing to LGB rights groups nationwide. In
response to lobbying efforts, legislators in New York, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts have proposed legislation that bans the use of SOCE on
minors.17 And New Jersey recently passed a ban modeled directly after
SB 1172.8
But activists and lawmakers should exercise caution before rushing to copy
California's legislation. This Note argues that even those opposed to the use of
SOCE should recognize the limitations of employing targeted legislation to ban
the use of any SOCE practice on minors.' 9 While California's willingness to
intervene on behalf of LGB youth is commendable, the regulatory strategy
employed in SB 1172 carries a range of presumably unintended consequences: it
reinforces an essentializing conception of sexual identity; it is particularly
amenable to First Amendment challenges since it treads on ill-defined areas of
First Amendment law; and it has the potential to generate political bacldash by
feeding into historically pervasive anti-gay narratives.
Furthermore, the SB 1172 approach is not the only way for activists and
legislators to successfully curtail SOCE. This Note proposes an alternative
16. EQCA Advances Bill to Limit Sexual Orientation Conversion Treatment by Mental Health Care
Providers, EQUALITY CAL. (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.eqca.org/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx
?c=kuLRJ9MRKrH&b=
7 9 4 2579&ct= 11722145.
17. Michelle Garcia, Massachusetts Considers Ex-Gay Therapy Ban, ADVOCATE (July 17, 2013,
12:40 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2013/07/17/massachusetts-considers-ex-gay
-therapy-ban; Jillian Rayfield, New York Renews Push for Gay Conversion Therapy Ban, SALON
(Aug. 22, 2013, 1o:o6 AM), http://www.salon.com /2ol3/o8/22/new york renews-push for
gay conversion therapy-ban; Lila Shapiro, Conversion Therapy Ban in Pennsylvania
Gaining Support, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://wwvw.huffingtonpost
.com/2ol3/og/18/conversion-therapy-pennsylvania n_3948815.html.
18. Kate Zernike, Christie Signs Bill Outlawing a Gay 'Cure,' N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 19, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2o13/o8/20/nyregion/christie-signs-bill-banning-gay-conversion
-therapy.html (describing the New Jersey ban). For the text of the recently passed
legislation, see An Act Concerning the Protection of Minors from Attempts to Change
Sexual Orientation and Supplementing Title 45 of the Revised Statutes, Assemb. 3371, 215th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2013), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2o12/Bills/A35oo/3371 Ii.htm.
ig. This Note operates on the assumption that variability in human sexual orientation is an
entirely benign phenomenon and that there are no morally or scientifically compelling
reasons to attempt to change sexual orientation, especially considering the potential harmful
effects of some forms of SOCE, see infra Section IA, and the ineffectiveness of all forms of
SOCE, see infra Section III.A. While this is, of course, not a universally accepted position,
exploration of the religious and moral debate surrounding homosexuality is outside the
scope of this Note.
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strategy that might bring about the same goal as SB 1172- namely, preventing
SOCE practitioners' access to LGB youth-using another area of law: anti-
deception statutes of general applicability. Since the mental health
establishment has concluded that SOCE is ineffective in changing sexual
orientation, SOCE therapists' activities could be actionable under state laws
that prohibit licensed professionals from engaging in deceptive or misleading
practices. California, which the Note uses as a case study, has long prohibited
mental health professionals from making deceptive claims, and the regulatory
system that implements these requirements could potentially be used to
challenge SOCE practitioners. An anti-deception approach to curtailing SOCE
could represent a promising alternative or supplement to the SB 1172 approach
in all states, but especially in states whose legislatures are unwilling to pass
full bans.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides background on SB 1172
and explores the understandings of SOCE's harmfulness that seem to underlie
the legislation. This Part argues that SB 1172'S conception of SOCE's
harmfulness is partially grounded in the mental health establishment's
conclusions, derived from clinical studies, but also stems from a more
ideologically driven understanding of LGB identity. Part II raises three separate
but interrelated problems with the legislation's broad view of the state's
interest in regulating SOCE. First, SB 1172 rests on assumptions about LGB
identity that do not necessarily capture the full range of individuals'
conceptions of their sexual orientations. By imposing these assumptions on
patient-therapist relationships, SB 1172 could potentially interfere with some
benign, non-SOCE therapeutic practices and, more generally, could feed the
persistent marginalization of groups who fall outside the mainstream discourse
on sexual orientation. Second, the legislation implicates an ill-defined and
controversial area of First Amendment doctrine: the scope of protection for
"professional speech." Though the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the
constitutionality of SB 1172, this result rested on some precarious assumptions
about SOCE. There are no guarantees that other courts will follow suit when
addressing similar bans. 20 And third, SB 1172 risks fostering political backlash
20. New Jersey's ban has already been challenged on First Amendment grounds in the District
of New Jersey. It was recently upheld as constitutional by one district court judge, see King
v. Christie, CV 13-5038, 2013 WI. 5970343 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2013), but has also been
challenged by other plaintiffs, see Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and
Damages, Doe v. Christie, No. 3:13-cv-o6629 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.lc.org
/media/998o/attachments/pr-complaint-change-therapy-district camden-nj_1o13.pdf.
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by playing into a persistent and politically powerful narrative that frames LGB
rights in opposition to "parental rights."
Part III examines potential alternative strategies for limiting SOCE
practitioners' access to patients that focus on the deceptive promises made by
most SOCE practitioners regarding the effectiveness of psychotherapeutic
intervention in changing sexual orientation. Despite the fact that SOCE is
widely considered ineffective, most SOCE practitioners misleadingly hold
themselves out as being able to "convert" patients from LGB to heterosexual.
These practices could fall under a broader -and, at least in California, already
existent-regime that defines deceptive promises made by therapists as
unprofessional conduct. Regulating SOCE through such a regime engenders
fewer normative or political-strategic concerns and could bring about results
similar to those of a targeted ban like SB 1172.
I. SB 1172'S ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE HARMFULNESS OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION CHANGE EFFORTS
In passing SB 1172, the California legislature explicitly stated that its goal
was "protecting . .. minors against exposure to serious harms caused by sexual
orientation change efforts.""1 A report issued by the California Senate Rules
Committee during the negotiations surrounding SB 1172 clarified this
rationale: "[T]he intent of this bill is to limit deceptive therapies that are
harmful to minors by mental health providers. This bill seeks to provide
awareness of the alternatives to and the potential harmful effects of sexual
orientation change therapies while also protecting children from these
treatments."22 According to the legislation, the state's "compelling interest" in
protecting children from these harms warranted a full ban on any attempt to
use SOCE practices on minor patients.23
While California framed its interest in regulating SOCE as preventing
"harm" to minors, understanding the precise nature of this harm requires
further analysis. This Part analyzes the legislation and its history to identify the
types of harm that seemed to be of concern to the California legislature. This
Part also examines the degree to which the mental health establishment's
21. S.B. 1172 § i(n), 2011-12 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
22. S. RuLEs COMM., OFFICE OF S. FLOOR ANALYSES, S.B. 1172: THIRD READING, 2d Sess., at 4
(Cal. May 25, 2012).
23. S.B. 1172 § 1(n).
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clinical studies, as well as other academic literature, support the conclusion that
SOCE is harmful in the ways identified in the legislation.
The types of harm recognized by SB 1172 can be broken down into two
categories. First, SOCE causes or exacerbates clinically demonstrable
psychological disorders, such as anxiety, depression, and suicidal behavior-
what the mental health professionals might call "iatrogenic effects" of SOCE
treatments.' Second, SOCE represents an inherently homophobic attack
against an LGB patient that leads to internalization of stigma and impedes
development of a positive LGB identity. The recognition of this second effect
as a harm is more explicitly premised on a set of ideological assumptions about
same-sex attraction, rather than clinically demonstrable scientific evidence.
These two types of harm are not explicitly identified as separate categories in
the text of SB 1172, nor are they mutually exclusive. But recognizing these
harms as distinct from one another is necessary to understanding the state's
potential role in regulating SOCE, as well as the problems with SB 1172's
approach, which are explored in the next Part.
Before addressing these two types of harm, it is important to settle on a
definition of what types of "therapies" can be classified as SOCE to begin with.
While noting that SOCE may include a range of different psychological tools,
including "aversive treatments such as electric shock or nausea inducing drugs
administered simultaneously with the presentation of homoerotic stimuli ...
[or] visualization, social skills training, psychoanalytic therapy, and spiritual
interventions,"2 the California legislature ultimately chose to ban "any
practices by mental health providers that seek to change an individual's sexual
orientation. "26 This definition would include both physical interventions, like
electroshock therapy, and pure "talk therapy," like psychoanalysis. This broad
definition of SOCE is generally in keeping with the approach of organizations
like the American Psychological Association (APA), which has treated SOCE as
a cohesive category that encompasses any attempt by a mental health
professional to change sexual orientation.27 However, as explained further
below, the distinction between practices like aversion therapy and exclusively
24. See infra note 30 for discussion of this term.
25. S. JUDICIARY COMM., S.B. 1172 (LIEU), 2d Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2012).
26. S.B. 1172 § 2(b)(1) (codified at CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 86s (West 2013)) (emphasis
added).
27. See Report of the American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic
Responses to Sexual Orientation, AM. PSYCHOL. AsS'N 22-25 (2009), http://www.apa.org/pi
/igbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf [hereinafter APA Report].
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verbal methods (like psychoanalysis) is significant in exploring the degree to
which SOCE's harmfulness is supported by clinical evidence.
A. Causing or Exacerbating Diagnosable Psychological Harm
Section i of SB 1172 lists the harmful psychological effects of SOCE
treatment that, according to recent research, provide a compelling case for the
ban. It states that recent reports have clearly established that SOCE's therapies
pose "critical health risks to lesbian, gay, and bisexual people."" These health
risks include the development of diagnosable psychological disorders such as
"depression" and "anxiety" as well as "suicidality, substance abuse, . . . sexual
dysfunction," and more. 9 But the claim that SOCE therapy can cause or
exacerbate diagnosable psychological disorders like general anxiety disorder or
clinical depression - the "iatrogenic effects" of psychotherapeutic
interventions -is only partially supported by recent reports from the mental
health establishment.
As the legislation explains, several types of therapy sometimes used by
SOCE practitioners are physically invasive, including electroshock therapy,
psychosurgery, use of psychotropic drugs or hormones, or general aversion
techniques (such as using painful electric currents or nausea-inducing drugs on
a patient while he is exposed to homoerotic images)." The harmfulness of
these physically invasive forms of SOCE is well documented. For example, the
2009 APA report, which surveyed all existing peer-reviewed, clinical-study-
based literature on SOCE, pointed to compelling clinical evidence32 that
aversive techniques "cause inadvertent and harmful mental health effects such
28. S.B. 1172 § s(b).
29. Id. § i(b), (d).
30. latrogenic effects occur when a medical or psychological intervention to treat a specific
problem causes or exacerbates other diagnosable problems. See APA Report, supra note 27, at
26; Corinne Rees, latrogenic Psychological Harm, 97 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 440
(2011).
31. Cruz, supra note 3, at 1304-07; Sean Young, Note, Does "Reparative" Therapy Really
Constitute Child Abuse?: A Closer Look, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 163, 167-68
(20o6).
32. APA Report, supra note 27, at 41-42 (citing John Bancroft, Aversion Therapy of Homosexuality:
A Pilot Study oflo Cases, 115 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 1417 (1969)).
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as increased anxiety, depression, suicidality, and loss of sexual functioning."33
These conclusions are also reflected in the numerous anecdotes, many now
available online, that describe SOCE patients' experiences with aversion
therapy. One former patient describes becoming suicidal after going through
therapy in which ice, hot coils, and electric currents were placed on his skin
while he watched homoerotic images.34 Even some courts and legislatures have
begun to recognize the harmfulness of physically invasive forms of SOCE
therapy. For example, the Ninth Circuit once described a SOCE treatment that
prescribed the use of sedative drugs as akin to torture.35 And many states now
regulate the use of treatments like psychosurgery on minors across the board.3'
However, the risks of SOCE methods that exclusively involve "talk
therapy" -including therapies grounded in psychoanalysis or in religious
traditions, which are by far the most common types of SOCE therapies used
today37-are less clearly documented in the psychological literature. In recent
years, the mental health establishment has explored the potential dangers of all
forms of SOCE, including talk therapy, but come to mixed conclusions. Most
significantly, the 2009 APA report concluded that while there is some,
primarily anecdotal, evidence that any form of SOCE has iatrogenic effects,
"[e]arly and recent research studies provide no clear indication of the
prevalence of harmful outcomes among people who have undergone efforts to
change their sexual orientation. "3 While some anecdotal evidence
33. Id. at 67; cf J. Thorpe et al., Aversion-Relief Therapy: A New Method for General Application, 2
BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 71 (1964) (cautiously endorsing aversion therapy but noting the
occurrence of mental health problems in patients).
34. Nathan Manske, True LGBTQ Stories: Gay Conversion Therapy Victim Says He Was
Electrocuted, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2011, 12:o6 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/nathan-manske/gay-conversion-therapy_b_ 9 97330.html.
35. Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9 th Cit. 1997) (reviewing an asylum application by a
Russian woman and finding that her torturous experiences in a Russian SOCE program
contributed to a compelling fear of persecution).
36. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6(d) (West 2013) ("Under no circumstances shall
psychosurgery be performed on a minor."); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1409 (2013)
("Prefrontal lobotomy shall be prohibited as a treatment solely for medical or emotional
illness of a minor patient.").
37. See Cruz, supra note 3, at 1307-10; Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 789 (2002)
("Even mental health professionals who currently advocate psychoanalytic therapy for
homosexuals deride such physical interventions as 'quackeries."' (quoting CHARLEs W.
SOCARIDES, HOMOSEXUALITY: A FREEDOM Too FAR 103 (1995))).
38. APA Report, supra note 27, at 41-43.
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demonstrates that even SOCE talk therapy can lead to psychological harm, 9
the APA report states that, due to the absence of rigorous clinical evidence, "we
cannot conclude how likely it is that harm will occur from SOCE."4o
Thus, the evidence makes a compelling case for the state's interest in
regulating physically invasive forms of SOCE (such as aversion therapy),
which have been demonstrated to lead to marked psychological harm.
However, the dearth of evidence that all forms of SOCE therapy (including
talk therapy) cause or exacerbate diagnosable psychological conditions makes it
difficult to rationalize a ban on any attempt by a therapist to change a minor
patient's sexual orientation on grounds of psychological harm alone. Perhaps
for that reason, the proponents of SB 1172 relied on a more expansive
understanding of "harm"-beyond scientifically demonstrable iatrogenic
effects-in justifying the legislation. The next Section explores this broader
conception of the harm inflicted by SOCE.
B. Reinforcing Stigma and Impeding Personal Development
The text of SB 1172 demonstrates that the California legislature also
understood SOCE as implicating a second, more ambiguous type of harm:
impeding the full individual self-realization of LGB patients by reinforcing
stigma and self-hatred. The legislation is predicated on the assumption that
"[b]eing lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a disease, disorder, illness, deficiency,
or shortcoming;"4 ' that is, that being LGB is entirely benign and not worthy of
psychological intervention. Any attempts to "treat" a non-heterosexual
orientation through therapy would then seem to be an illegitimate -perhaps
even animus-driven- attempt to stigmatize homosexuality. According to the
text of SB 1172, exposing patients to such stigma in the context of a patient-
therapist relationship is antithetical to a therapist's true role in "promot[ing]
self-acceptance" 42 and stifles the development of a patient's authentic self. The
legislation explains that effects such as "decreased self-esteem and authenticity
to others, increased self-hatred, . . . feelings of anger and betrayal, . . . [and] a
39. See discussion infra note 134 (describing allegations of abuse made by plaintiffs in a lawsuit
against a SOCE practitioner).
40. APA Report, supra note 27, at 42.
41. S.B. 1172 § 1(a), 2011-12 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
42. Id. § i(e) (quoting Position Statement: The Professional School Counselor and LGBTQYouth,
AM. SCH. COUNs. Ass'N, http://www.safeschoolscoalition.org/RG-PositionStatement
-asca.html (last updated June i, 2011)).
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feeling of being dehumanized and untrue to self' can all emerge from SOCE
therapy.43 The legislation even explicitly clarifies that its restrictions are based
on the assumption that a therapist's primary task should be positively
affirming a patient's LGB identity, explaining that, under the legislation's
definitions, SOCE "does not include psychotherapies that . . . provide
acceptance, support, and understanding of clients[' LGB orientation or] . . .
identity exploration and development.""
While SOCE's iatrogenic harms, described above, are (or at least could be)
grounded in clinical studies, conceiving of SOCE therapy as per se harmful
because of its role in stigmatizing LGB people requires a more subjective set of
assumptions. Indeed, this type of harm may not necessarily be demonstrable
through clinical studies at all. Psychologists often speak of "minority stress" or
"internalized homophobia" as phenomena that are worthy of psychological
attention, but the literature generally treats these phenomena as significant
only to the extent they lead to diagnosable mental health effects, such as
depression, anxiety, or sexual dysfunction.4 5 The APA report, for example,
comments on the problem of "stigmatization" in the lives of LGB people (and
the potential role of SOCE in furthering this stigma) ,4 but mainly points to
instances in which stigmatization leads to measurable "negative mental health
consequences." 47 In more general terms, assessment of "harm" in the course of
psychological treatment is often tied to "symptom worsening [or] the
appearance of new symptoms,"48 presumably because such iatrogenic effects
can be observed in the course of clinical studies and potentially reproduced in
further studies. The notion that stigmatization in the course of therapy is per se
harmful, regardless of the development of iatrogenic effects-which is the
position that SB 1172 seems to take-would therefore seem difficult to prove
solely on the basis of clinical evidence.
43. Id. S i(b).
44. Id. § 2(b)(2) (codified at CAL. BuS.&PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013)).
45. See, e.g., Joanne DiPlacido, Minority Stress Among Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals: A
Consequence of Heterosexism, Homophobia, and Stigmatization, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION: UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND BISEXUALS
138, 139-41 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998); Ilan H. Meyer & Laura Dean, Internalized
Homophobia, Intimacy, and Sexual Behavior Among Gay and Bisexual Men, in STIGMA AND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra, at 160, 16o-66.
46. APA Report, supra note 27, at 15-17.
47. Id. at 55.
48. Scott 0. Lilienfeld, Psychological Treatments That Cause Harm, 2 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 53,
56 (2007).
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This is not to say that there are no compelling arguments that SOCE
contributes to the stigmatization of LGB people and is problematic for this
reason alone. These arguments, however, generally operate in normative,
rather than scientific, terms. For example, Laura Gans has argued that victims
of SOCE therapies should have a cause of action under the tort of "intentional
infliction of emotional distress" under the theory that SOCE therapy can be
considered harmful because of the very "outrageousness" of the claim that non-
heterosexual orientations should be "eradicate[d]."49 For a therapist to impose
this problematic outlook on his patient, in a context in which a therapist
should be looking out for the patient's wellbeing, is itself a "homophobic
attack" on the patient "under the shameless guise of beneficence.""o
David Cruz provides a more subtle account of the normative problems
posed by a therapist who attempts to change a patient's sexual orientation.
Though Cruz does not claim that such acts are harmful enough to warrant a
full ban51 (contrary to the proponents of SB 1172), he does point to the "role of
medical authority in pronouncements of homosexuality's pathology" and the
"stigmatizing effects" that such authority can have.52 On this account, for a
therapist to question a patient's LGB sexual orientation is inevitably to impose
an anti-gay ideological conception of homosexuality on a patient (even if the
therapist frames her role as simply providing the patient with a choice between
homosexuality and heterosexuality). This is especially problematic because it
lends the appearance of objective authority to homophobia. An LGB person
may be able to recognize a homophobic attack as ideologically driven when it
comes from a peer, but when it comes from an "ostensible medical
professional[]" it carries greater potential to define the LGB person's sense of
self-worth.53 Cruz analogizes to the work of Eugenia Kaw, who has studied
Asian women who seek cosmetic surgery to make their eyelids look more like
those of Caucasian women. Kaw argues that such surgeries are inherently
harmful because they "'normalize[]' . . . the negative feelings of Asian
49. Laura Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: Sexual Orientation Conversion Therapy and
Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 245-46 (1999).
50. Id. at 249.
51. Cruz, supra note 3, at 1350-51, 1354 (speculating that the "harms" of SOCE might warrant
greater regulation of these practices, but adding the caveat that there is not yet sufficient
evidence that the harms of SOCE arc significant enough to warrant a complete ban).
52. Id. at 1359.
s3. Id. at 1352-53, 1358-59.
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American women about their features" and, in so doing, reinforce self-hatred.14
So too in the case of SOCE, the very act of trying to change an LGB person's
sexual orientation would seem to normalize society's disapproval of
homosexuality, reinforcing self-hatred and impeding the patient's development
of a positive LGB identity.
While these arguments may indeed make a compelling case against SOCE,
the fact that this stigmatization-based conception of harm is predicated on a set
of clearly normative assumptions makes its role in demonstrating California's
"compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors"55 potentially problematic. While the first type of harm described
above - SOCE's iatrogenic effects - is demonstrable through clinical scientific
study,56 all forms of SOCE can only be understood as per se harmful under this
second conception of harm if we embrace a set of ideological assumptions
about homosexuality, especially its fixedness, its benignity, its easy
categorizability, and its status as constitutive of a person's identity. The next
Part unpacks some of these assumptions to explore some of the potential
drawbacks of SB 1172's approach.
In sum, California's argument for a full ban rests on an amalgam of both
clinical evidence of SOCE's harmfulness and a more ideological conception of a
therapist's proper role in affirming a patient's sexual orientation in order to
avoid stigmatization and allow the patient to develop a fully realized sense of
self. Accounting only for clinical evidence of SOCE's harmfulness could, at
54. Id. at 1359 (quoting Eugenia Kaw, Medicalization ofRacial Features: Asian-American Women
and Cosmetic Surgery, 7 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 74, 83 (1993)).
55. S.B. 1172 § 1(n), 2011-12 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
s6. One might object that every discourse, including the clinical/scientific psychological
discourse described above, is norm-driven. See generally 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY
OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 51-73 (Robert Hurley trans., 1990) (uncovering the
norms that underlie the "scientific" study of sexuality). Understanding scientific/clinical
evidence of psychological harm as more "objectively true" than discussions of SOCE's
potential stigmatizing effects may strike some-especially those sympathetic to post-
structuralism- as a false dichotomy. However, this Note is predicated on the assumption
that such a dichotomy is legally significant- that clinically reproducible evidence can
provide sufficient authority to rationalize a regulatory regime that inevitably quashes
opposing viewpoints (as SB 1172 does), whereas predominantly normative or ideological
arguments may not be able to carry this burden.
57. See infra Section II.A for further discussion of these assumptions.
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least at this point, rationalize only a ban on physical interventions like aversion
therapy, since the psychological establishment has not yet reached a consensus
on whether talk-therapy forms of SOCE are per se harmful. However, by also
relying on the stigma-based conception of SOCE's harmfulness, California
could rationalize the need for a ban on "any practices by mental health
providers that seek to change an individual's sexual orientation."" The next
Part explains why some of the normative assumptions that inform this second
conception of SOCE's harmfulness might nonetheless pose problems for a
regulatory regime like SB 117 2-both from the standpoint of LGB people who
may not share the conception of LGB identity that underlies the regime, and
from the perspective of the First Amendment.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE SB 1172 APPROACH
This Part explores why the strategy that animates SB 1172-using
legislation to completely prohibit any attempt by a mental health provider to
change a minor patient's sexual orientation -might be problematic, even from
the standpoint of those opposed to SOCE. These concerns are offered from
several different but interrelated perspectives. From a purely normative
perspective, SB 1172 is problematic because it is predicated on a categorizing
and essentializing account of sexual orientation and imposes this conception
using the power of the state. From a legal perspective, SB 1172 is especially
amenable to First Amendment challenges because it prohibits a type of speech
on partially ideological grounds. Finally, from a political-strategic perspective,
SB 1172 is inexpedient and could easily foment bacldash because it may feed
popular conceptions of LGB people as "anti-family" by appearing to take away
"parental rights." While these three criticisms operate from different vantage
points, they seize on two specific aspects of the strategy at play in SB 1172:
treating any questioning of a patient's sexual orientation by a therapist as per se
harmful,59 and singling out SOCE for special regulation in the first place. The
essentialism and First Amendment critiques focus primarily on the first aspect,
and the political bacldash critique focuses on the second.
58. S.B. 1172 § 2(b)(1) (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE S 865 (West 2013)) (emphasis
added).
59. See supra Section I.B.
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A. SB 1172 Assumes and Normalizes an Essentializing Conception of Sexual
Orientation
As discussed in Part I, SB 1172 imposes a blanket ban on any attempt by a
licensed therapist to alter a minor patient's sexual orientation. Formulating this
ban required the legislature to identify "homosexual," "bisexual," and
"heterosexual" as concrete markers of identity-as things that a person must
either "be" or not "be."o When dealing with a patient, a therapist seemingly
must identify the patient as belonging to one of these categories and work only
to promote "identity exploration and development,"" while taking care to
avoid forcing a patient into a category to which she does not belong. But this
highly categorized and identity-driven conception of sexual orientation may be
at odds with many people's personal experiences of sexual orientation.12 As this
Section argues, SB 1172's assumptions about the easy categorizability of sexual
orientation, and its broad prohibition of "any practices by mental health
providers that seek to change an individual's sexual orientation,"" are
problematic for two reasons. First, the ban may have collateral effects outside
its immediate goal of banning SOCE by constraining even a non-SOCE-
practicing therapist's ability to fully engage with patients who do not conceive
of their sexual orientation in conventional terms. Second, the ban may
reinforce a categorized and identity-driven conception of sexual orientation in
the contemporary discourse on sexuality, thereby minimizing the experiences
of those who fall outside of mainstream definitions of sexual orientation.
While the majority of same-sex-attracted individuals understand their
orientation to be a fixed and essential aspect of their personhood, many others
do not. 6 4 The fact that SB 1172 is predicated on the existence of concrete and
6o. S.B. 1172 § 1(a) ("Being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a disease, disorder, illness, deficiency,
or shortcoming.").
61. Id. 5 2(b)(2) (codified at CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 865).
62. This is, of course, not a problem unique to SB 1172. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has famously
distinguished between a "minoritizing" view of sexuality, which focuses on homosexual
identity, and a "universalizing" view, focused on the implications of LGB-rights questions
for all "people across the spectrum of sexualities." Sedgwick has demonstrated that these
two discourses are deeply intertwined in contemporary discussion of sexuality. EVE
KoSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 1, 40-44 (1990).
63. S.B. 1172 5 2(b)(1) (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 865).
64. See Gregory M. Herek et al., Demographic, Psychological, and Social Characteristics of Self-
Identified Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults in a U.S. Probability Sample, 7 SEXUALITY RES. &
Soc. POL'Y 176, 186 (2010).
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easily identifiable categories of sexual identity would seem to privilege
especially the experiences of gay men over those of lesbians and bisexuals.
Recent research has shown that "variability in the emergence and expression of
female same-sex desire during the life course" is in fact quite common and that
many lesbian-identified women experience their sexuality in more fluid terms
than gay men.6" The persistent understanding of sexuality as easily definable
and fixed may be a consequence of treating the experiences of men as
paradigmatic and imposing this conception on women."6 Bisexual experience
has been even more marginalized within mainstream discourse on sexuality, a
phenomenon often labeled "bisexual erasure." Kenji Yoshino has explored the
persistence of bisexual erasure in the law, explaining that even a legal regime
that claims to recognize the existence of the category of "bisexual" can still be
guilty of bisexual erasure if the regime implicitly operates on the assumption
that a person must be either attracted to people of the same gender or people of
the opposite gender.6 7 SB 1172 seems to provide an example of this
65. Lisa M. Diamond & Ritch C. Savin-Williams, Explaining Diversity in the Development of
Same-Sex Sexuality Among Young Women, 56 J. Soc. ISSUES 297, 298, 301-07 (2000); see also
Lisa M. Diamond, Sexual Identity, Attractions, and Behavior Among Young Sexual-Minority
Women Over a 2-Year Period, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 241 (2ooo) (finding high fluidity
in the sexual identities and behaviors of a sample of adolescent sexual-minority women);
Robin West, Sex, Reason, and a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413, 2432 (1993) (reviewing
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992)) ("Many women, for example, have felt
themselves to be heterosexual only to later discover a much richer, truer, somehow more
authentic identity as a 'woman-identified-woman.' Similarly, a significant number of gay
men and women find themselves at some point in their lives 'inexplicably' attracted to a
man or woman of the opposite sex, and suddenly embroiled in an unexpected heterosexual
relationship.").
66. See LISA M. DIAMOND, SEXUAL FLUIDITY: UNDERSTANDING WOMEN'S LOVE AND DESIRE
(2009) (making this argument); Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian
Experience, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 177, 193 (Ann Snitow et al.
eds., 1983) ("Lesbians have historically been deprived of a political existence through
'inclusion' as female versions of male homosexuality. To equate lesbian existence with male
homosexuality ... is to deny and erase female reality . . . ").
67. See Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 446-54
(2000). Yoshino cites the "horseplay exemption" in same-sex sexual harassment claims,
under which a court interprets an alleged act of harassment as an example of "homosocial"
horseplay rather than as a sexually-charged "homoerotic" act of harassment. Courts will
frequently accept evidence of a defendant's opposite-sex relationships as proof that the
alleged act of harassment could not have possibly been sexual in nature. Such arguments
implicitly deny bisexuality's existence by positing that if a defendant manifests opposite-sex
attraction, an alleged act of harassment against someone of the same sex cannot possibly be
motivated by same-sex desire. Id.
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phenomenon: while bisexuals are identified for protection in the legislation,
along with gays and lesbians, the scheme is still predicated on the assumption
that a therapist can easily identify the category to which a person's sexual
attraction belongs and thus take steps to affirm (rather than seek to change)
the patient's sexual identity. The ambiguity presented by many bisexuals -
whose same-sex attraction may be far more context-specific and may ebb and
flow over time-would seem to present a quandary for therapists under the
regime. Similarly, the regime fails to acknowledge that many-especially
younger people-now eschew labels such "gay" or "bisexual" altogether,
instead using the umbrella term "queer" to describe anyone who falls outside
mainstream expectations of sexuality or gender performance.68
In practice, SB 1172 seems to require that a therapist operate under the
assumption that every patient can be easily identified under the conventional
definitions of lesbian, gay, bisexual, or straight, regardless of whether those
categorizations are consistent with the patient's behavior or sense of self. This
requirement could impact the ability of even non-SOCE-espousing therapists
to fully engage with patients with ambiguous or non-traditional sexual
identities. As a hypothetical example, it seems unclear how a therapist, under
SB 1172's regime, should react when confronted with a patient who self-
identifies as a lesbian but speaks of growing attraction to men and seeks to
make sense of these feelings. Attempts by the therapist to encourage this
patient's exploration of her heterosexual attraction, despite her avowed lesbian
identity, could potentially run afoul of SB 1172's prohibition of "any practices
by mental health providers that seek to change an individual's sexual
orientation. "9 While SOCE practitioners often employ specific
psychotherapeutic techniques in the service of an explicit attempt to change a
patient's sexual orientation, 70 "seek to change" is left open-ended in the
legislation, and seemingly does not require any specific anti-LGB animus on
the part of the therapist. SB 1172's prohibitions thus could potentially cover any
statements by a therapist-even innocuous ones-that might lead a patient to
change from self-conceiving as one category of sexual orientation to another.
Thus, a therapist who said to the questioning lesbian-identified patient
described above, "I think you are straight," (or even "I think you are bisexual")
68. A Definition of "Queer," PARENTS, FAMILIES & FRIENDS OF LESBIANS & GAYS, INC.,
http://community.pflag.org/page.aspx?pid= 952 (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
69. S.B. 1172 § 2(b)(1), 2011-12 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
865 (West 2013)).
70. See discussion supra Part I; infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
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could potentially be guilty of unprofessional conduct under the SB 1172
regime.7'
Generally, we might understand this dilemma as a kind of collateral effect
of the state's attempt to regulate the specific (and genuine) harms presented by
SOCE. Targeting SOCE through a wide-ranging regime that implicitly
requires a therapist to clearly identify a person as belonging to a specific
category of sexual orientation, and then to work only to affirm that category,
might constrain even a non-SOCE-espousing therapist from grappling with
the full range of her patients' experiences of sexual identity. The California
legislature presumably did not intend to restrict this kind of benign therapeutic
intervention. But its decision to predicate the legislation on the existence of
fixed categories of sexual identity that correlate to specific forms of behavior,
its assumption that these categories are easily identifiable by a therapist, and its
assumption that these categories form an essential part of a patient's identity,72
seem to have spawned a regime with potentially far more wide-ranging
effects.73
While instances in which non-SOCE therapists are constrained by SB 1172
(such as the hypothetical scenario described above) are likely to be rare, SB
71. One might counter that SB 1172's caveat that "'[s]exual orientation change efforts' does not
include psychotherapies that . . . provide acceptance, support, and understanding of clients
or the facilitation of clients' coping, social support, and identity exploration and
development," S.B. 1172 § 2(b)(2) (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 865), might
immunize these more innocuous statements from sanction. However, the line between a
statement that "seeks to change" sexual orientation and one that seeks to promote "identity
exploration and development" is not easy to draw, especially when it comes to assessing a
therapist's intent. After all, even avowed SOCE practitioners often think of themselves as
seeking to unearth an LGB patient's authentic heterosexual self. See, e.g., Joseph Nicolosi,
The Meaning of Same-Sex Attraction, NARTH, http://www.narth.org/docs/niconew.html
(last visited Dec. 4, 2013) ("For my clients, homosexual enactment does not represent their
personal intentions, will or self-identity, and it is in violation of their aspirations and life
goals. Gay life is unsatisfying to them, so they enter therapy in the hope of reducing their
unwanted attractions and developing their heterosexual potential.").
72. See supra Section I.B.
73. It is important to note that these concerns over the legislation's scope (especially the
ambiguity of the phrase "seek to change") is likely insufficient to support a vagueness
challenge. As the Ninth Circuit noted in recent litigation on SB 1172's constitutionality,
"uncertainty at a statute's margins will not warrant facial invalidation if it is clear what the
statute proscribes in the vast majority of its intended applications." Pickup v. Brown, No.
12-17681, slip op. at 47 (9 th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014), amending and denying reh'g, 728 F.3d 1042
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1172's problematic collateral effects might extend beyond specific patient-
therapist relationships into the broader contemporary discourse on sexual
orientation. As several scholars have argued, systems of classification and
categorization, especially those imposed using the coercive power of the
regulatory state, have profound power to "shap[e] reality"; namely, to define
what characteristics become normatively or politically salient in dividing people
from one another.74 Indeed, such arguments have animated some critiques of
recognizing LGB people as a protected class for equal protection purposes,
especially in light of the tendency of courts to reinforce the importance of
certain supposedly "immutable" traits when identifying a group as a protected
class. 7s As much as identifying LGB people as a suspect class based on the
"immutability" of homosexuality might signal the state's role in protecting
LGB people, it might also reinforce the notion that sexual orientation is a
fundamental, identity-defining characteristic, thereby marginalizing the
experiences of those who do not conceive of their sexuality along these lines.76
Similarly, SB 1172, by assuming a conception of sexual orientation that
focuses on rigid categories77 and takes for granted that sexual preference
74. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 744-50 (2008) (explaining how the
government's system of classifying gender reifies the definitions of gender upon which this
system is based). See generally GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS
OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1999) (theorizing the normative
consequences of systems of classification).
75. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 795 (2011) (highlighting the
argument "that when the courts protect a trait as part of a group's identity, they strengthen
. . . stereotypes").
76. See Lisa Bower, Queer Problems/Straight Solutions: The Limits ofa Politics of "Official
Recognition, " in PLAYING WITH FIRE: QUEER POLITICS, QUEER THEORIES 267 (Shane Phelan
ed., 1997); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argumentfrom Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 567 (1994) ("When pro-gay advocates use
the argument from immutability before a court on behalf of gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals, they misrepresent us."); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay
Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1380
(2000) ("[A] doctrinal requirement [in the equal protection context] of immutability
compels homogeneity. Rather than questioning the legitimacy or value of discriminatory
practices, it demands that oppressed people 'change' to fit within a presumably 'valid' social
structure that, in reality, embraces oppressive hierarchies."); see also Sonia Katyal, Exporting
Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 110-15 (2002) (describing the importance of an
identity-based conception of sexual orientation in equal protection cases like Romer v. Evans,
but pointing out that imposing this model on "individuals who may engage in same-sex
sexual behavior, but who do not fit a substitutive paradigm between identity and conduct,
can be unduly confining, exclusionary, and inappropriate").
77. See supra discussion accompanying notes 60-62.
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invariably forms an essential aspect of a person's identity75 normalizes this
understanding within the contemporary discourse on sexuality. In practice,
this could reinforce broader attempts to delegitimize the experiences of some
lesbian-defined women and many bisexuals or queer-identified people whose
experiences differ from mainstream expectations regarding sexuality, as
explained above.79 It also might impede greater acceptance of non-Western
conceptions of sexuality in Western debates about sexual orientation. Scholars
such as Sonia Katyal have explored the problems that a categorized, "identity-
based" conception of sexual orientation can pose for non-Western
communities. The notion that sexual orientation constitutes an essential aspect
of a person's identity can "often collide with . .. preexisting social meanings of
same-sex sexual activity,"so posing particular problems for immigrant
communities."' In this respect, legislation crafted around an identity-based
framework, like SB 1172, may also marginalize the experiences of members of
non-Western cultures who conceive of same-sex sexual activity in ways
different from, or incompatible with, an identity-oriented conception.
These criticisms are not meant to deny the very real concerns, discussed
above, that SB 1172 seeks to address: that certain forms of SOCE lead to
concrete psychological damage and that any form of SOCE is inherently
harmful because it lends medical authority to attempts to stigmatize and
further self-hatred among LGB people. However, as Part III argues, there may
be alternative strategies for preventing these harms that would not require the
state to espouse a settled definition of sexual orientation and directly regulate
the practices of therapists in service of this definition.
B. SB 1172 Is Particularly Vulnerable to First Amendment Challenges
As recent litigation in California demonstrates," SB 1172 also treads on a
78. See supra Section I.B.
79. See supra discussion accompanying notes 64-68.
Bo. Katyal, supra note 76, at ioo.
81. See id. at lo8-68 (describing the rise of the identity-oriented "substitutive model" of gay
identity in the United States and documenting examples in which it has clashed with non-
Western conceptions of sexuality).
82. While the trajectory of this litigation is explored in detail below, a brief overview is in order.
Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012), enjoined implementation of SB 1172
on First Amendment grounds, whereas Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-o249 7-KJM-EFB,
2012 WL 6021465 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012), denied a motion for preliminary injunction. The
cases were consolidated before the Ninth Circuit, which also entered a preliminary
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particularly controversial and ill-defined area of First Amendment law: the
regulation of professional-client speech. After its passage, SB 1172 was
immediately challenged by practitioners and patients seeking a preliminary
injunction preventing California from implementing the new law. The
challengers argued that SB 1172 violates the First Amendment by prohibiting
therapists from engaging in protected speech. Two federal district courts
considered separate motions for a preliminary injunction and came to opposite
conclusions. In Welch v. Brown, Judge William Shubb enjoined
implementation of SB 1172, holding that the statute regulates protected speech
and lacks content and viewpoint neutrality.3 In Pickup v. Brown, however,
Judge Kimberly Mueller rejected the plaintiffs' motion, holding that because
"SOCE therapy is subject to the state's legitimate control over the professions,
SB 1172's restrictions on therapy do not implicate fundamental [First
Amendment] rights."4 The Ninth Circuit granted a preliminary injunction
pending appeal15 and, after consolidating the two cases, ultimately upheld SB
1172's constitutionality.86 The court also denied the plaintiffs' petition for
rehearing en banc17 but recently stayed its mandate for at least ninety days to
allow the plaintiffs to file a petition for writ of certiorari.
The primary question posed by the Pickup case was whether banning
SOCE therapy for minors involves regulation of psychotherapists' professional
conduct," or whether SB 1172 in fact prohibits protected speech.9 The Ninth
injunction in Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681, 2012 WL 6869637 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2012), but
later held the statute constitutional, Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014),
amending and denying reh'g, 728 F. 3d 1042 (9 th Cir. 2013)
83. 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1113-17.
84. 2012 WL 6021465, at *12.
85. Pickup, 2012 WL 6869637.
86. Pickup, No. 12-17681.
87. Order Denying Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Pickup, No. 12-17681.
88. Pickup, No. 12-17681, slip op. at 30 (claiming that "[t]he first step in our analysis is to
determine whether SB 1172 is a regulation of conduct or speech" and holding that it is a
regulation of conduct); see also Pickup, 2012 WL 6021465, at *9 (holding that SB 1172 is a
regulation of conduct); Erwin Chemerinsky, 'Gay Conversion' Therapy Is Not Protected
Free Speech, ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2012, 2:41 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national
/archive/2o12/12/gay-conversion-therapy-is-not-protected-free-speech/266102 ("The fact
that conversion therapy is done primarily through words does not mean that it is
automatically protected as speech under the First Amendment. Never have the courts treated
the First Amendment as an absolute protection for speech, and indeed they have upheld
many laws that restrict speech by professionals, such as doctors and lawyers.").
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Circuit ultimately decided that:
Senate Bill 1172 regulates conduct. It bans a form of treatment for
minors . . . . Pursuant to its police power, California has authority to
regulate licensed mental health providers' administration of therapies
that the legislature has deemed harmful [and] . . . the fact that speech
may be used to carry out those therapies does not turn the regulation of
conduct into a regulation of speech. 0
The Ninth Circuit thus determined that SB 1172, as a regulation of professional
conduct that only regulates speech "incidentally," is outside the scope of the
First Amendment protection and simply needed to withstand the rational basis
test.91 The panel held that the statute could easily meet this burden. 9 2 In so
doing, the court rejected Judge Shubb's argument that SB 1172 regulates speech
(and was not content- or viewpoint-neutral) and therefore must withstand
strict scrutiny.93
But as the differing district court rulings (and the Ninth Circuit's earlier
decision to enter an emergency injunction pending appeal) demonstrate, the
Ninth Circuit's ultimate decision affirming SB 1172's constitutionality was by
no means inevitable. Indeed, the scope of so-called "professional speech" is
particularly ill-defined in First Amendment doctrine.94 Robert Post has
8. See Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that SB 1172 prohibits
protected speech), rev'd sub nom. Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681 (9 th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014).
go. Pickup, No. 12-17681, slip op. at 38 (citations omitted). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
found that SB 1172 does not infringe patients' and therapists' freedom of association, is not
void for vagueness, is not overbroad, and does not infringe parents' rights to control their
children. Id. at 45-53. But the bulk of the court's analysis was devoted to the free speech
question.
91. Id. at 42 ("[Wie conclude that any effect [SB 1172] may have on free speech interests is
merely incidental. Therefore, we hold that SB 1172 is subject to only rational basis review
and must be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.").
92. Id. at 43 ("Without a doubt, protecting the well-being of minors is a legitimate state
interest.").
93. Welch, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 11o2.
94. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939, 944-45 (highlighting the divided views among
courts and scholars regarding the regulation of speech by professionals); see also Daniel
Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social
Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1999) ("Current First Amendment analysis lacks a
coherent view of speech in the professions."); Eugene Volokh, Little-Discussed Free Speech
Question, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 28, 2004, 3:37 PM), http://www.volokh.com/archives
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succinctly identified the scope of the debate around professional speech,
pointing out that a doctor's speech is clearly regulable as professional conduct,
without offending the First Amendment, when the state seeks only to ensure
that a doctor's conduct remains consistent with the standards of her
profession.95 As an obvious example, a doctor has no First Amendment right to
deliberately withhold a diagnosis; such a failure to speak can be censured as
malpractice without implicating the First Amendment.9' At the other extreme,
regulation of speech by a doctor that is not related to the professional conduct
of her field would arguably receive some First Amendment protection, even if
the speech is uttered in a professional context. 97 But the line between speech
that is incidental to professional conduct and protected speech is not easy to
parse, considering the underdeveloped case law in this area.9'
The Ninth Circuit's decision grappled with this issue, but its conclusions
remain open to question. The panel acknowledged that a doctor has a First
Amendment right to express his opinions in public, but it explained that this
protection diminishes when it comes to speech uttered in the confines of a
"professional-client relationship" and ultimately ceases when it comes to
speech that is uttered in a context exclusively regulated by accepted standards
of professional conduct; at that point, the speech is simply speech incidental to
/archive_2004_05-23-2004_05-29.shtml#1o85773062 (arguing that the constitutional status
of professional speech has not been fully developed by scholars and courts). Scholars have
taken radically different positions on whether, normatively, speech incidental to professional
conduct should be outside the protections of the First Amendment. Compare Paula Berg,
Toward a First Amendment Theory ofDoctor-Patient Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased
Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 243 (1994) (arguing that doctor-patient speech should
be fully protected under the First Amendment), with Katharine McCarthy, Note, Conant v.
Walters: A Misapplication of Free Speech Rights in the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 56 ME. L.
REV. 447, 465 (2004) (arguing that such speech may be properly subject to regulation by the
state).
95. Post, supra note 94, at 951-53 (pointing out that "we routinely sanction doctors who deviate
from professional standards in the course of their professional speech because we believe
that in professional practice the safety and health of patients" is paramount).
96. Id. at 950-51.
g. Id. at 953-60 (arguing at length that a South Dakota law requiring doctors to describe a
fetus as a "human being" to a patient before performing an abortion is an example of
compelled ideological, rather than professional, speech and thus runs afoul of the First
Amendment).
g8. See Halberstam, supra note 94, at 834 ("[T]he Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely
addressed the First Amendment contours of a professional's freedom to speak to a client.").
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professional conduct (for example, making or withholding a diagnosis).99 The
panel concluded that a ban on all forms of SOCE falls squarely in this latter
category. But the court reached this result only by deferring to the California
legislature's finding that SOCE is per se "harmful" and thus outside the
"accepted standard" of the psychological profession. 00
As Part I explained, however, the California legislature's findings that all
forms of SOCE are per se harmful may have relied on the mingling of both
clinical evidence and more ideological assumptions about the nature of sexual
orientation.o'0 If SB 1172 were tailored exclusively to prevent practices that lead
to clinically demonstrable psychological damage, in clear violation of the
therapist's basic professional standard of "avoid[ing] harm,"1 0 2 it would be an
obvious example of the regulation of professional conduct, outside the scope of
the First Amendment. But as explained above, SB 1172 also operates under a
more subjective conception of harm, which understands all SOCE as
stigmatizing and thus per se harmful to the fostering of a patient's positive
LGB identity.0 3 Had the Ninth Circuit questioned the legislature's evidence, it
might have concluded that a full SOCE ban could not be justified as a pure
regulation of professional conduct, at least until further evidence emerged that
all forms of SOCE are in fact harmful and thus clearly outside the norms of the
psychological profession. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit even acknowledged that
there is some question as to whether all SOCE is per se harmful, but ultimately
g. Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681, slip op. at 37-38 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014), amending and
denying reh'g, 728 F.3 d 1042 (9 th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he First Amendment tolerates a substantial
amount of speech regulation within the professional-client relationship that it would not
tolerate outside of it. And that toleration makes sense: When professionals, by means of
their state-issued licenses, form relationships with clients, the purpose of those relationships
is to advance the welfare of the clients, rather than to contribute to public debate. . . . Most,
if not all, medical and mental health treatments require speech, but that fact does not give
rise to a First Amendment claim when the state bans a particular treatment. When a drug is
banned, for example, a doctor who treats patients with that drug does not have a First
Amendment right to speak the words necessary to provide or administer the banned
drug.").
1oo. Id. at 35-39, 42-44.
loi. See discussion supra Section I.B.
102. "Primum non nocere" or "first, do no harm" is widely considered to be the fundamental credo
of the medical and mental health professions. Lilienfeld, supra note 48, at 53.
103. See discussion supra Section I.B.
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concluded that the legislature's assumptions were "plausible" and thus
warranted deference.10 4
A more probing inquiry might have concluded that while banning some
forms of SOCE-such as aversion therapy-rests squarely within the state's
power to regulate professional conduct, SB 1172 may also, in effect, ban a
certain type of stigmatizing speech"os that falls outside the scope of pure
professional conduct. Indeed, it is possible that a ban on all forms of SOCE as
per se harmful improperly attempts to cut off First Amendment scrutiny by
claiming that SOCE is categorically professional conduct, and thus outside the
scope of the First Amendment, despite a lack of clear evidence that it should be
considered as such. o6
It is important to highlight that this Section has only argued that a SOCE
ban should not necessarily be categorically considered a regulation of
"professional conduct" outside the scope of the First Amendment. But even if a
court recognized that a SOCE ban implicates some First Amendment
protection, it might not necessarily find such a ban unconstitutional. While full
explication of the First Amendment status of SOCE is outside the scope of this
104. Pickup, No. 12-17681, slip op. at 44. There is something tautological about the court's
reasoning here. The court determined, as a threshold matter, that a SOCE ban was a
regulation of professional conduct because it forbids activities that would fall outside the
"accepted standard of care," id. at 36, because of their harmfulness. In making this
determination, the court implicitly needed to rely on the legislature's finding that SOCE is
per se harmful. But it only directly addressed this question after having decided that the ban
is a regulation of professional conduct and thus only subject to rational basis review. Under
rational basis review, the court concluded that it "need not decide whether SOCE actually
causes 'serious harms'; it is enough that it could 'reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker,"' id. at 43 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of
Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043 (9th Cit. 2000)). In this respect, the
court's acceptance of the legislature's findings, under rational basis review, informed even
the court's decision that rational basis review, rather than intermediate or even strict
scrutiny, was warranted.
105. See supra Section I.B.
1o6. Cf Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (holding that the government may not
"assume that every expression of a provocative idea" can be categorically considered
"fighting words" that are outside the scope of the First Amendment; rather, the government
must provide evidence that such speech indeed falls outside the coverage of the First
Amendment); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916-17 (1982) (demanding
"precision of regulation" in determining when someone can be held liable for damages while
engaging in a First Amendment activity, on the assumption that while violence is not
protected by the First Amendment, incidents of violence in a protected First Amendment
context do not cause all other activities in that context to categorically lose the protections of
the First Amendment) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
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Note, the low public value of speech used in SOCE practices -especially
considering the growing consensus that SOCE is ineffective 07- might very
well lead a court to find that a SOCE ban can survive a First Amendment
challenge.'os
While this analysis is now generally inapplicable in California, it is clear
that the SB 1172 approach treads on a particularly contested and hazy area of
the First Amendment.o 9 Similar lawsuits are therefore likely to emerge in other
states that pass legislation modeled after SB 1172-indeed, the recent New
Jersey ban has already been challenged on First Amendment grounds"0 -at
least until the courts more carefully define the nature of professional speech in
First Amendment doctrine"' or greater evidence emerges that SOCE is per se
harmful under the professional standards of mental health professionals (and
thus regulable as pure professional conduct). Courts that are less deferential to
legislative findings that SOCE is per se harmful may be unwilling to treat such
bans as pure regulations of professional conduct, thus opening the door to
greater First Amendment scrutiny and the potential for the bans to be struck
107. See infra Section III.A.
108. See, e.g., Appellants' Corrected Reply Brief at 13-24, Welch v. Brown, No. 13-15O23, 2013 WL
950392 (9th Cir. 2013) (arguing that even if the court found that SB 1172 implicated the First
Amendment, the legislation could still survive either intermediate or strict scrutiny); Paul
Sherman & Robert McNamara, Protecting the Speech We Hate, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/o/io/opinion/protecting-the-speech-we-hate.html ("[T]he
plaintiffs in the California case would not have automatically won their case had the Ninth
Circuit held that the First Amendment applied. Instead, the government would then have
had the burden of coming forward with actual evidence that the law addressed a real
problem and limited speech no more than was necessary. That burden is serious, but it is
not insurmountable. . . . It is possible, maybe even likely, that California will be able to meet
this burden with regard to its reparative therapy law.").
iog. See sources cited supra note 94.
110. See sources cited supra note 20.
iii. Judge O'Scannlain, in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit's recent denial of rehearing en banc
in Pickup, highlighted just how ambiguous this area of First Amendment doctrine remains.
He argued that all professional speech carries some degree of First Amendment protection.
In his view, treating SB 1172 as a regulation of professional conduct that is completely
immune from First Amendment scrutiny contravenes Supreme Court precedent and
improperly creates a new category of unprotected speech. Order Denying Petition for Panel
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Pickup v. Brown, No, 12-17681, slip op. at 9 ( 9th Cir.
Jan. 29, 2014) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general
/2o14/ol/29/12-17681 order amended opinion.pdf.
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down on First Amendment grounds."' From a purely strategic perspective,
then, it would seem advisable for SOCE opponents to work around this
problem using alternative regulatory strategies that are less likely to generate
contentious litigation, as Part III explores.
C. SB 1172 Could Foment Political Backlash
Because SB 1172 operates as a direct ban on parents' ability to seek SOCE
therapy for their children, it has already been criticized for undermining a
parent's right to control his child's upbringing. Immediately after the
legislation was passed, conservative activists began accusing the California
legislature of privileging gay rights over "parental rights.""3 As one activist put
it, "[t]his legislation is a grotesque violation of the rights of parents over their
children."114
The argument that SB 1172 infringes on "parental rights" probably has little
merit from a purely constitutional perspective. Opponents of the bill argued, in
their original motion for a preliminary injunction before Judge Mueller, that
SB 1172 implicates the Supreme Court's decisions that read the Due Process
Clause as protecting parents' rights to control their children's education, such
112. Understanding a SOCE ban as implicating protected speech might also subject a similar ban
to a more powerful overbreadth challenge. As in its discussion of whether SB 1172 infringed
on protected speech, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appellants' overbreadth challenge by
deferring to the state's finding of SOCE's harmfulness. Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681, slip
op. at 49-50 ( 9 th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014), amending and denying reh'g, 728 F.3d 1042 (9 th Cir.
2013) (holding that the "overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep" and that any potential
overbreadth "is small in comparison with the 'plainly legitimate sweep' of the ban" (quoting
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))). A less deferential court might be more
likely to find an overbreadth challenge compelling.
113. See, e.g., Audrey Barrick, Ex-Gay Advocates Blast Calif Senator over Bill Banning Reparative
Therapy, CHRISTIAN POST (Aug. 1o, 2012, 4:42 PM), http://www.christianpost.com
/news/ex-gay-advocates-blast-calif-senator-over-bill-banning-reparative-therapy-79847; Ben
Johnson, Democrat Admits, 'Attack on Parental Rights' Is 'the Whole Point' of Banning
Sex Orientation Therapy, LIFESITENEWS (Aug. 2, 2012, 5:09 PM), http://www
.1ifesitenews.com/news/democrat-admits-attack-on-parental-rights-is-the-whole-point-of
-banning-sex; Open Letter From Parents of Homosexuals and Former Homosexuals to State
Senator Ted Lieu of Torrance, Cal., PARENTS & FRIENDS OF ExGAYs & GAYS,
http://pfox.org/Parental-Rights-Under-Attack.html (last visited May 19, 2012, 9:03 PM).
114. Pete Winn, California Considers Legislation Making It a Crime to Counsel Children Not to Be
Homosexual, CNS NEWS (May 9, 2012, 10:09 PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article
/california-considers-legislation-making-it-crime-counsel-children-not-be-homosexual.
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as Pierce v. Society of Sisters"s and similar cases."' But Judge Mueller in Pickup
thoroughly rejected this argument, holding that SB 1172 is consistent with the
limitations, identified by the Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts"'7 and
subsequent cases, that the state may place on parental rights in the interest of a
child's welfare."' Judge Shubb declined to address the parental rights
argument altogether in Welch, enjoining implementation of SB 1172 exclusively
on First Amendment grounds." 9 Perhaps recognizing the weakness of these
arguments, opponents of SB 1172 only cursorily mentioned the parental rights
challenge in briefs before the Ninth Circuit. 0 And the Ninth Circuit ultimately
accepted Judge Mueller's holding, concluding that "SB 1172 does not infringe
on the fundamental rights of parents. "121
But even if the argument that SB 1172 infringes on parental rights has little
legal merit, it could still prove to be a powerful rhetorical device in mustering
opposition to legislation on the model of SB 1172. In the modern era,
opponents of LGB rights have often employed rhetoric that frames state
"promotion" of homosexuality as infringing on the rights of heterosexuals.
Rather than employing the once-prevalent attacks that LGB people are "sinful"
or "biologically degenerate," opponents of LGB rights now frequently employ
"social republican arguments," contending that a policy that affirms basic LGB
rights invariably disrupts elements of the social order and especially family
life.' This "no promo homo" discourse is based on the assumption that
citizens should have the right to be free from the "promotion" of
115. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down an Oregon state law requiring parents to send their
children to public schools on the ground that the Due Process Clause protects a parent's
right to make this decision).
16. Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 37-42, Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-
CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 5983762 (E.D. Cal. 2012).
117. 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a statute prohibiting minor children from working in
certain unsafe jobs did not violate parental rights because the state maintains an interest in
securing the welfare of children).
118. Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *16-23 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 4, 2012).
11g. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012), rev'd sub nom. Pickup v. Brown, No.
12-17681 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2014).
120. See, e.g., Plaintiff-Appellants' Reply Brief, Pickup, No. 12-17681, 2013 WL 792995.
121. Pickup, No. 12-17681, slip op. at 53.
122. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation ofAntigay Discourse and the
Channeling Effect offudicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1337-55 (2000) (documenting this
shift in rhetoric).
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homosexuality in order to safeguard religious liberty, family values, or
parental rights.
No promo homo arguments have been most directly employed in the
context of public schools and other state-controlled areas that implicate the
lives of children, under the assumption that "wavering" children might become
gay if exposed to a favorable or neutral conception of homosexuality.'
Considering the strong public values that favor parents' control over their
children's upbringing," these arguments have proven quite powerful
rhetorically and politically.' And this strategy is still alive and well: The recent
"Yes on 8" campaign, which succeeded in convincing California voters to pass a
referendum revoking same-sex couples' right to marry, invoked the parental-
rights oriented, no promo homo narrative with great success. Yes on 8 activists
used advertisements that painted the marriage equality movement as
privileging same-sex marriage over a parent's right to control her children's
moral and religious upbringing. 1 6 For example, the "Everything to Do With
Schools" ad, which aired on California television networks, argued that if
marriage equality were allowed to stand, public schools would be forced to
teach a more inclusive definition of marriage and parents would not be able to
opt their children out of such lessons.127
123. Id. at 1359-62, 1366-69 (observing that, for example, some states have maintained laws
allowing public school teachers who "encourag[e]" homosexuality to be dismissed, and that
child custody cases have often been decided against LGBT parents because of "the unproven
belief that children raised by gay parents will themselves become gay").
124. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that "the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children[] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by this Court"). Even Prince, despite holding that the state maintains an
interest in protecting children, recognized the importance of parental authority over a child's
upbringing. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (describing a parent's
"control of the child and his training" as a "serious" interest that implicates basic democratic
values).
125. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, Anita Bryant famously spearheaded efforts to defeat
gay civil rights ordinances by fostering fears of "recruitment" and "molestation." In the
1990s, right-wing and religious groups employed anti-gay pamphlets and videos that
depicted LGB people as pedophiles in order to question whether such a group truly deserves
"special rights" and "special protection" from discrimination. See GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY
MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY'S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 38-39, 45-47
(2004).
126. For a detailed description of this strategy, see Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental
Rights: Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. &C.L. 357 (2009).
127. Id. at 381 (describing the "Everything To Do With Schools" commercial).
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As the opposition to the bill demonstrates, SB 1172 brazenly plays into the
basic fears over the state usurping parental authority that underlie aspects of
the no promo homo narrative. Removing parents' ability to seek SOCE
therapies for their children not only reinforces anti-gay fears about "wavering"
children being "converted" to homosexuality (however irrational those fears
might be) but also, at least superficially, appears to "violate" a fundamental
element of parental authority: the right to control a child's medical treatments.
While it is impossible to know how ubiquitous the anti-parental-rights
rhetoric surrounding SB 1172 will become, the bill at least carries a risk of
encouraging a kind of popular political mobilization similar to what the Yes on
8 campaign provoked.
It is important to note that fears about "bacldash" to gains by minority
groups can often be overstated.12' Furthermore, any concern about backlash
must be weighed against the broader goals of the social movement; even if
there is a true risk of bacldash, the risk may be worth taking. The goal of this
Note is not to argue that concerns about backlash should take precedence over
the importance of addressing the genuine harms posed by SOCE. Rather the
Note's aim is to identify the risk of counter-mobilization and propose
solutions - as the next Part does - that might partially mitigate it, while still
allowing the state to regulate minors' exposure to SOCE.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE: DECEPTIVENESS-BASED REGULATION
In November 2012, a group of former patients of a SOCE-practitioner
group called Jews Offering New Alternatives for Healing (JONAH)'2 9 filed suit
against the organization in the Superior Court of New Jersey.130 The plaintiffs,
128. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: Neu' Questions
About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2077 (2011) (analyzing the history of the abortion debate
and Roe v. Wade and arguing, inter alia, that "countermobilization and escalating conflict
(often referred to as 'backlash') is a normal response to increasing public support for
change" and should not be viewed as a particularly exceptional phenomenon).
129. JONAH was formerly known as Jews Offering New Alternatives for Homosexuality.
JONAH's History, JONAH, http://www.jonahweb.org/sections.php?secld= n (last visited
Nov. 12, 2013).
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represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and several private firms,'3 '
allege that JONAH's promise to "cure" them of their homosexuality was
fraudulent and deceptive in violation of New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act.132
The plaintiffs maintain that JONAH's practices rest on the "false premise that
gay sexual orientation is a mental disorder" and thus treatable, and that
JONAH fraudulently claims that its specific SOCE practices are supported by
"[e]mpirical evidence" attesting to their efficacy and are "well-grounded in
science."" These claims "induced" the plaintiffs to pay JONAH several
thousand dollars for treatments, which had no effect on their sexual
orientations. 34
The JONAH case, which seems to be the first of its kind,' 5 has yet to be
resolved.' 6̂ But the plaintiffs certainly face an uphill battle; the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act has an "intent" requirement,'37 which may be difficult to
131. SPLC Files Groundbreaking Lawsuit Accusing Conversion Therapy Organization of Fraud, S.
POVERTY L. CENTER (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splc
-files-groundbreaking-lawsuit-accusing-conversion-therapy-organization-of-frau.
132. N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 56:8-1 to -195 (West).
133. Complaint, supra note 130, 38-42.
134. Id. 43-44. The plaintiffs also allege that JONAH's specific SOCE practices are
"psychologically abusive" and involve denigration of LGB people, reliving of past trauma,
frequent requests that the patient "undress" in front of the therapist, and inappropriate
"group cuddling sessions." Id. 45-64. While these practices could arguably give rise to
claims under other areas of law-including sexual harassment law-the complaint seeks
damages only under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.
135. See Trudy Ring, Groundbreaking Lawsuit Challenges 'Ex-Gay' Therapy, ADVOCATE (NOV. 27,
2012, 7:57 PM), http://www.advocate.com/society/law/2012/11/27/groundbreaking-lawsuit
-challenges-exgay-therapy.
136. The defendants' motion to dismiss was recently denied and the case appears to still be in
discovery. Order Denying Motion Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint for Failure to State a
Cause of Action for Which Relief Can Be Granted, Ferguson v. JONAH, No. L-5473-12
(July 19, 2013), http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/case/order-denying
-motion-to-dismiss.pdf; Judge Rejects Conversion Therapy Group's Attempt to Have SPLC Case
Thrown Out, S. POVERTY L. CENTER (July 19, 2013), http://www.splcenter.org/get
-informed/news/judge-rejects-conversion-therapy-group-s-attempt-to-have-splc-case-thrown
-out-o. The most recent information about the case can be found at Case Docket: Michael
Ferguson, et al., v. JONAH, et al., S. POVERTY L. CENTER, http://www.splcenter.org/get
-informed/case-docket/michael-ferguson-et-al-v-jonah-et-al (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
137. N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 56:8-2 (West 2012) ("The act, use or employment by any person of any
unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material
fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection
with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent
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meet. Furthermore, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act is designed primarily
to target fraudulent sales of "merchandise or real estate"13 and a court might
hesitate to apply it to therapists. But the case is still significant because it points
to the fact that claims made by SOCE practitioners are quite similar to other
kinds of deceptive promises made by doctors and commercial entities. In this
respect, SOCE could potentially be targeted using wide-ranging anti-deception
regulation, rather than through legislation specifically designed to ban SOCE
practices.
This Part argues that anti-SOCE activists and lawmakers should focus on
the deceptiveness of SOCE and target these therapies in the context of a more
wide-ranging regime. All states regulate the behavior of licensed mental health
professionals by requiring adherence to a code of professional conduct as a
condition of maintaining a license to practice.' 9 Through these codes of
conduct, some states forbid therapists from engaging in deceptive practices;14o'
indeed, California law already allows the state Board of Psychology to de-
license therapists who use deceptive advertising or make deceptive or
unrealistic promises to their existing patients.141 Such anti-deception provisions
in state laws that regulate mental health professionals could potentially be
applied to SOCE practitioners. The scientific literature clearly supports the
conclusion that all forms of SOCE are ineffective, which means that most self-
defined SOCE practitioners engage in practices that might be actionable under
anti-deception provisions like California's. Using a broader deceptiveness-
oriented regime, rather than a targeted ban like SB 1172, would allow SOCE to
be curtailed without necessarily triggering the essentialism, First Amendment,
and backlash concerns discussed in Part II. In this respect, an anti-deception
approach poses a promising alternative to the SB 1172 approach in general, but
it might prove especially attractive in states that are unwilling to pass targeted
SOCE bans like SB 1172.
performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled,
deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice ...... (emphasis
added)).
138. See id. § 56:8-2 to 8-2.32 (describing specific rules for "misrepresenting geographic origin of
merchandise" or illegitimately using a "going out of business sale" advertisement).
139. See Michael R. Espina, An Introduction to the Mental Health Professions: What Lawyers Should
Know, PA. LAw., March/April 2004, at 40, 41-42.
140. See, e.g., MINN. R. 7200.5100 (2013); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 2 9 .1(b)(12)
(2013).
141. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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This Part proceeds in four Sections. Section III.A outlines the broad
consensus among psychologists that SOCE is ineffective and explains that
SOCE practitioners almost uniformly hold themselves out as being able to
change a patient's sexual orientation despite this consensus. Section III.B
considers the practicalities of developing a regime that would generally
prohibit deceptive psychotherapeutic practices, including SOCE. Since existing
provisions of the California Business and Professions Code already prohibit
deceptive advertising by medical professionals, and also limit a therapist's
ability to make unrealistic promises to his patients, this Part uses California as
a case study for how an anti-deception regime may provide sufficient grounds
for de-licensing SOCE-practicing therapists. Section III.C then explains why
this broader deception-based approach could be an especially promising
strategy in states unlikely to pass targeted SOCE bans, and might also be
advisable even in states like California, since it is less likely to succumb to the
criticisms of SB 1172 discussed in Part II. Finally, Section III.D addresses
potential objections to this approach.
A. SOCE's Ineffectiveness and the Case for Deception
The question of whether the promises made by SOCE therapists are
deceptive hinges on whether these therapies are ever effective in changing
sexual orientation. The mental health establishment has indeed come to the
consensus that no compelling scientific evidence exists that SOCE treatments
are effective in bringing about changes to sexual orientation. The 20o9 APA
report, for example, concluded that "the results of scientifically valid research
indicate that it is unlikely that individuals will be able to reduce same-sex
attractions or increase other-sex sexual attractions through SOCE."142 The
report also highlighted the specific lack of evidence that SOCE treatments can
prove effective in leading children to "develop" heterosexual orientations. 43
Similarly, the American Psychiatric Association, the National Association of
Social Workers, and the Pan American Health Organization have all issued
reports or policy statements declaring that there is no evidence that SOCE
therapy is ever effective in changing sexual orientation.'"
142. APA Report, supra note 27, at 3; see also id. at 26-43.
143. Id. at 4.
144. Nat'1 Comm. on Lesbian, Gay & Bisexual Issues, "Reparative" and "Conversion" Therapies for
Lesbians and Gay Men: Position Statement, NAT'L Ass'N OF Soc. WORKERS (Jan. 21, 2000),
http://www.naswdc.org/diversity/1gb/reparative.asp; Position Statement on Therapies Focused
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Though SB 1172 was primarily framed around preventing SOCE's harms,
the legislation also pointed to the fact that "there is no evidence that sexual
orientation can be altered through therapy."145 Because of this lack of evidence,
the drafters claimed, SOCE therapists' promises to "cure" homosexuality could
be considered deceptive. In a legislative report submitted during negotiations,
the sponsor of the bill, Senator Ted Lieu, explicitly stated that California's
children require protection from the "deceptive" and "sham" promises of
SOCE.'** An early draft of the legislation even created a special cause of action
for non-minor SOCE patients "if the sexual orientation change efforts were
conducted [on a non-minor] . . . by means of therapeutic deception."'"r
"Therapeutic deception" was defined as "a representation by a psychotherapist
that sexual orientation change efforts are endorsed by leading medical and
mental health associations or that they can or will reduce or eliminate a
person's sexual or romantic desires, attractions, or conduct toward another
person of the same sex."'+5 This provision, however, was removed in later
drafts that modified the bills to focus primarily on the state's interest in
preventing harm to minors.'49
As SB 1172's drafters understood, there is indeed a strong case that SOCE
therapists' claims of being able to change sexual orientation could be
considered deceptive, in light of the broad consensus that sexual orientation
on Attempts to Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion Therapies), AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N (2000), http://www.psychiatry.org/File%2oLibrary/Advocacy/2oand
%20Newsroom/Position%2oStatements/ps2o000ReparativeTherapy.pdf; "Therapies" to
Change Sexual Orientation Lack Medical Justification and Threaten Health, PAN AM. HEALTH
ORG. (May 17, 2012), http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=comcontent&view
=article&id=6803.
145. S.B. 1172 § 1(k), 2011-12 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (quoting Stewart L. Adelson et al., Practice
Parameter on Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Sexual Orientation, Gender Nonconformity, and Gender
Discordance in Children and Adolescents, 51 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY
957, 967 (2012)).
146. S. JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT ON SB 1172 (LIEU) As AMENDED APRIL 30, 2012, 2011-12 sess., at
5 (Cal.).
147. S. RULES COMM., OFFICE OF S. FLOOR ANALYSES, S.B. 1172: THIRD READING, 2d Sess., at 3-4
(Cal. Apr. 30, 2012).
148. Id.
149. The bill was later amended to focus exclusively on the use of SOCE treatments on minors,
removing provisions that provided less burdensome legal restrictions, such as an "informed
consent" requirement, for SOCE practices used on non-minors. It was during this
amending process that the "therapeutic deception" cause of action was also removed. S.
RULES COMM., OFFICE OF S. FLOOR ANALYSES, S.B. 1172: THIRD READING, 2d Sess., at 1 (Cal.
May 25, 2012).
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cannot be altered through therapeutic intervention. Despite this consensus,
SOCE therapists almost uniformly assert that sexual orientation can be
changed and often advertise their service by citing to spurious authorities that
purport to substantiate these claims.'50
"Deception" is a nebulous term that encompasses a broad range of
activities. This Note adopts the definition set forth by the Federal Trade
Commission in its policy papers: that deception involves a material
"representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer"
acting reasonably given the circumstances.' In keeping with this definition,
many states forbid salespeople from defrauding consumers using misleading
claims or false information. As in the case of the New Jersey commercial statute
described above, such anti-deception statutes may sometimes require a
showing of fraudulent intent on the part of the salesperson.' But an intent
requirement is not integral to a showing of deception and many states,
including California, use a more open-ended test for deception when
regulating professions that are already under closer state control because of a
state-granted licensing scheme, such as the mental health professions.'53 As the
next Section explains, SOCE could potentially be actionable under these
provisions of California law that are already designed to regulate deception in
the mental health professions: specifically, those that forbid a therapist from
engaging in deceptive advertising and from making unrealistic guarantees to a
patient.
B. A Deceptiveness-Based Approach to Regulating SOCE: California as a Case
Study
There are two distinct, though not mutually exclusive, approaches that
150. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8 and infra note 155.
151. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Oct. 14, 1983), http://www
.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.
152. See supra note 137.
153. For example, California forbids licensed mental health professionals from using advertising
that includes "false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement[s]" (including scientific
assertions that are not verifiable through peer reviewed studies) where the statements are
"for the purpose of or [are] likely to induce ... the rendering of professional services." CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE 5 651(a), (b)( 7) (West 2013). Fraudulent intent ("purpose") on the part
of the practitioner seems to satisfy this requirement, but so can false statements that are
simply "likely to induce" the consumer to purchase the professional's services,
notwithstanding any true fraudulent intent. See discussion infra Subsection III.B.i.
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might be used in crafting a regime to regulate deceptive psychological practices
and thereby regulate SOCE implicitly. The regime could censure therapists for
making deceptive promises in advertising, or it could censure therapists for
making unrealistic guarantees (unsupported by the mainstream understanding
of what can be accomplished through psychotherapeutic intervention) to a
patient, even in an existing patient-therapist arrangement. This Section
considers both of these possibilities and explains how they may already be
reflected in California's code of professional conduct for mental health
professionals. While either of these approaches could be used to regulate the
use of SOCE on any patient, regardless of age, this Section also considers the
specific benefits of crafting a regime designed to protect minors from deceptive
therapies. Finally, the last Subsection considers the practicalities of how SOCE,
as a specific type of deceptive therapy, might be targeted under California's
existing general restrictions on deceptive psychological advertising and
practices.
1. Deceptive Advertising
Many SOCE practitioners explicitly advertise their supposed ability to
"cure" patients of homosexual attraction. In so doing, they frequently claim
that sexual orientation can be changed'5 and often cite to allegedly "scientific"
evidence of SOCE therapy's efficacy."' In this respect, SOCE practitioners'
activities could be curtailed under a regime that prohibits mental health
professionals from making deceptive and misleading claims about the
effectiveness of their practices in advertising.
Such an approach would be consistent with the ways that states regulate
the advertising of licensed therapists. Indeed, California already maintains
several statutes that prohibit fraudulent or deceptive advertising by mental
health professionals. For example, practitioners of the "healing arts" (which
154. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 8.
155. See, e.g., Is Change Really Possible?, PEOPLE CAN CHANGE, http://www.peoplecanchange.com
/change/possible.php (last visited May 22, 2013) ("In more than 5o years of research,
including 48 studies . . . there are data and published accounts documenting easily
more than 3,000 cases of change from homosexual to heterosexual attraction, identity
and functioning."); Scientific and Anecdotal Evidence, AUTHENTIC REPARATIVE
THERAPY, http://www.davidpickuplmft.com/#!what-does-the-science-say/c8o6 (last
visited November 16, 2013) ("There is significant scientific evidence which demonstrates
that sexuality is rather fluid in nature and can be changed."); see also Godfrey, supra note 8
(citing a NARTH study).
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includes medical doctors and psychologists) are prohibited from disseminating
any "public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, or
deceptive statement" (which, notably, would include any "scientific claim that
cannot be substantiated by reliable, peer reviewed, published scientific
studies") and that does so "for the purpose of," or such that it is "likely to
induce," the "rendering of professional services."" 6 Under these provisions,
any statement that is likely to encourage patients to retain the therapist's
services, but is based on false information, is sufficient to implicate the statute,
whether or not the therapist had fraudulent intent.157 Practitioners who violate
these requirements can be de-licensed. i5California also incorporates this exact
definition of deceptive advertising into the lists of "unprofessional conduct"
(which provide grounds for license revocation) for several additional
therapeutic professions, including "marriage and family therapists,"159
"educational psychologists, "6o "social workers,"' and "professional clinical
counselors." 62
The advertising used by many SOCE practitioners could easily be
encompassed by a regime like California's. As explained above, the consensus
of the mainstream mental health community is that SOCE is ineffective and
that sexual orientation cannot be changed through therapeutic intervention.'6 3
In this respect, any claims made by SOCE practitioners that their therapies are
"substantiated by reliable, peer reviewed, published scientific studies1164 - or
even a more guarded assertion regarding SOCE's efficacy that still creates
is6. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 651(a), (b)( 7 ) (West 2013). Such deceptive statements include,
inter alia, a statement that "[c]ontains a misrepresentation of fact," "[i]s likely to mislead or
deceive because of a failure to disclose material facts," is "intended or is likely to create false
or unjustified expectations offavorable results," or "[m]akes a scientific claim that cannot be
substantiated by reliable, peer reviewed, published scientific studies." Id. § 651(b)(1)-(3),
(7).
157. Additionally, the set of California laws that prohibit businesses from making "false or
misleading statements" in advertising their products or services, id. § 17500, also applies to
psychologists, id. S 2960(g).
i58. Id. § 651(g).
IS9. Id. § 4982(p).
160. Id. § 4989.54(e).
161. Id. § 4992.3(q).
162. Id. § 4999.90(p).
163. See supra Section III.A.
164. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 651(b)( 7).
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"unjustified expectations of favorable results"'s-may provide grounds for de-
licensing under California law. While this approach would not provide a
blanket ban on SOCE practices-as SB 1172 does-it would deprive
practitioners of one of the main resources used to attract patients. 66 The next
Subsection considers a regime that might allow for a more comprehensive ban
of SOCE practices.
2. Making Unrealistic Promises to a Patient
SOCE practices could also be targeted through a regime that prohibits
therapists from directly making deceptive or unrealistic promises to a patient
even after therapy has commenced. Such restrictions would be consistent with
the state's general authority to censure licensed practitioners who deviate from
the professional standards of the healthcare-provider community.
Parts of California's Business and Professional Code may already be up to
this task and could provide a useful example to other states. Under California
law, a therapist may be de-licensed for acts that involve "[flunctioning outside
of his or her particular field or fields of competence as established by his or her
education, training, and experience."' 67 Similar restrictions also apply to
marriage and family therapists,' 8  educational psychologists,'6 9 social
workers,1 70 and clinical counselors.' 7 1
The scope of what kinds of behavior can be considered a professional
service outside a therapist's "fields of competence" is ambiguous and not well
defined in California's case law or the Board of Psychology's regulations. But a
promise or attempt to treat a condition that is not understood by experts to be
treatable might very well fall under these provisions. Equality California
appeared to accept this definition of "competence" during the SB 1172 litigation
before the Ninth Circuit."' This definition is also supported by the APA's code
165. Id. § 651(b)(3)(A).
166. See sources cited supra notes 8, 155.
167. CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 29 6 0(p).
168. Id. § 4982(S).
169. Id. § 4989.54(r).
170. Id. § 4992.3(m).
171. Id. 5 4999-90(s).
172. See Response of Equality California in Opposition to Plaintiff-Appellants' Emergency
Motion for Temporary Injunction Pending Appeal at 17, Pickup v. Brown, No. 12-17681,
2012 WL 6801742 (9th Cir. 2012) (claiming that section 2960(p) would be violated by a
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of ethics, which states that a psychologist working within her "competence"
must use skills "based upon established scientific and professional knowledge
of the discipline." 73 On this account, SOCE practices that attempt to change a
patient's sexual orientation- against the understanding of the mental health
establishment that sexual orientation cannot be changed through therapeutic
intervention 74 -could qualify as a deceptive attempt to perform a service
outside the therapist's field of competence. 75 If this interpretation is correct,
many of the kinds of guarantees made and practices used by the National
Association for Research & Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), JONAH,
and other "ex-gay" groups could already be considered unprofessional conduct
under California law. Indeed, one might argue that acting outside a therapist's
"field of competence" is inherent in the very nature of practicing SOCE qua
SOCE (i.e., actively attempting to change a patient's sexual orientation),
considering the mental health establishment's consensus that sexual
orientation cannot be changed through psychotherapeutic intervention.176
3. A Note on the Potential for a Minors-Specific Approach
It is important to note that the two more broad-ranging approaches to
regulating SOCE, described above, would be able to ban (or at least limit) the
access of SOCE practitioners to any patient, rather than minors specifically.
therapist who "[t]ell[s] a patient that the therapist is able to treat a particular condition"
when she is actually unable to do so).
173. Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N § 2.04 (2010),
http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/principles.pdf.
174. See supra Sections I.B, III.A.
175. Some might object that this type of regulation is not a true regulation of "deceptive"
practices, but rather has other goals. But, as explained above, this Note operates under the
assumption that deception is defined by any "representation, omission or practice that is
likely to mislead the consumer," see supra note 151 and accompanying text, and such
behavior need not be limited to the context of advertising. California's requirement that a
therapist function within the fields of her competence seems based on the assumption that
there is a risk that therapists can deceive patients about the scope of their professional
abilities, even in one-on-one encounters, presumably because of the great sense of authority
conferred by a mental health professional degree and state license.
176. Of course, this may be an overly ambitious reading of current California law. But California
(and other states) could certainly adopt legislation that explicitly identifies as unprofessional
conduct making unrealistic promises and attempting to treat a condition that is not
considered treatable by the mental health community. Such a statute would clearly
encompass most SOCE practices.
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This contrasts with the approach of SB 1172, which only restricts minors' access
to SOCE therapies on the assumption that the state maintains a special interest
in preventing harm to children (who presumably lack the ability to fully
consent to SOCE's potential harms, as adults do). The proponents of SB 1172
originally favored more comprehensive legislation, which would have
mandated that practitioners receive a non-minor patient's "informed consent"
before commencing SOCE treatments, but later withdrew these proposals.17
The alternative schemes described above-which would focus primarily on
SOCE's deceptiveness rather than on its potential psychological harms -might
in fact allow for greater regulation of SOCE practices across different age
groups.
The state's interest in regulating deceptive practices extends across all age
groups because deception leads consumers to make choices they might not
make if presented with accurate information."'8 This is a problem that can
potentially affect anyone, regardless of age. But there might be a still more
compelling case for regulating a child's exposure to deceptive psychological
practices. The FTC, in its policy statements, has pointed out that the metric for
deception is whether a reasonable person would accept the deceptive claim at
face value and rely on it."' For children, this standard may sometimes be lower
since "[a]n interpretation that might not be reasonable for an adult may well
be reasonable from the perspective of a child. "iso
Thus, while the California law that restricts mental health professionals
from making deceptive promises does not single out minors, there might
nonetheless be a compelling case for adding special provisions to state
definitions of unprofessional conduct that create a lower burden of proof or
harsher penalties for the use of therapeutic practices that deceptively promise
unattainable results to children (either in advertising or during the course of
therapy).
177. S. RuLES COMM., OFFICE OF S. FLOOR ANALYSES, S.B. 1172: THIRD READING, 2d Sess., at 1
(Cal. May 25, 2012) (describing the amendments withdrawing provisions of the legislation
related to non-minors).
178. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note i5l.
179. Id. ("[W]e examine the practice from the perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances. If the representation or practice affects or is directed primarily to a particular
group, the Commission examines reasonableness from the perspective of that group.").
i80. Roscoe B. Starek, III, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, The ABCs at the FTC: Marketing and
Advertising to Children, Summary of Prepared Remarks to the Minnesota Institute of Legal
Education (July 25, 1997), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/minnfin.shtm (making this
point in the context of advertising to children).
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4. The Practicalities of Targeting SOCE Through an Anti-Deception Regime
The problem with targeting SOCE using a more general anti-deception
regime -like the areas of California law that already prohibit therapists from
engaging in deceptive advertising or in conduct outside their areas of
"competence" - is that such a strategy would require using non-legislative
processes to establish that SOCE clearly falls under such a regime.
While the potential hurdles that might be encountered during such
processes are addressed further in Section III.C, it is worth outlining, in
practical terms, how SOCE might be regulated under existing California law.
One possibility is that the California Board of Psychology could use its
rulemaking authority' to adopt a regulation' that clarifies that SOCE
advertising and SOCE efforts within a doctor-patient relationship are covered
by the state's definitions of unprofessional conduct (for the reasons described
above). Such a regulation would seem to be generally consistent with the
Board's practice of issuing regulations that clarify the scope of the state's
unprofessional conduct legislation.5 3
A more likely scenario is that individual victims of SOCE could file
complaints against SOCE practitioners for deceptiveness-based professional
misconduct on a case-by-case basis, in a manner similar to the targeted
approach of the JONAH litigants described above.154 California law makes it
relatively easy for individual patients to file complaints against therapists for
professional misconduct.' Upon receiving such a complaint, a peace officer
from the Medical Board of California begins an investigation. If compelling
181. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2930 (West 2013) ("The board shall from time to time adopt rules
and regulations as may be necessary to effectuate this chapter.").
182. Under California law, "'[r]egulation' means every rule, regulation, order, or standard of
general application or the amendment, supplement, or revision of any rule, regulation,
order, or standard adopted by any state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the
law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure." CAL. Gov'T CODE §
11342.6oo (West 2013).
183. For example, the Board has issued a regulation clarifying that psychologists' advertising
may "not promote the excessive or unnecessary use of . . . services" that the licensed
psychologist is authorized and competent to provide and that such advertising can be
considered professional misconduct under the California Business and Professional Code.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, 5 1397 (2013).
184. See supra notes 129-136.
185. See Cal. Bd. of Psychology, Filing a Complaint with the Board of Psychology, CAL.
DEP'T CONSUMER AFF., http://www.psychboard.ca.gov/consumers/filecomplaint.shtml (last
visited Dec. 4, 2013).
1573
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
evidence of unprofessional conduct is discovered, the case is turned over to the
Attorney General's Office, which may begin pursuing disciplinary actions
(often license revocation) against the accused therapist. While the therapist
and the state may reach a settlement, such cases sometimes end up before an
administrative law judge, who issues a proposed decision that, if adopted by
the Board of Psychology, then becomes final and publicly available."' These
decisions can be appealed directly to the Superior Court of California through a
writ of administrative mandamus.51
Former SOCE patients could use these existing administrative and judicial
mechanisms to challenge therapists who continue to engage in SOCE practices.
These therapists would likely need to cease advertising that sexual orientation
can be changed and engaging in SOCE practices-or face sanctions, including
license revocation. Former SOCE patients could likely be aided by anti-SOCE
organizations, such as the Southern Poverty Law Center, which has begun
keeping track of all active SOCE practitioners, and inviting former SOCE
patients to share their stories.' Indeed, it is possible that members of these
organizations could themselves pursue claims against SOCE therapists even if
they never experienced SOCE therapy, at least in California, since California
allows "[a]nyone who thinks that a psychologist, psychological assistant or
registered psychologist has acted illegally, irresponsibly, or unprofessionally"
to file a complaint. 19
While a case-by-case approach might prove tedious and time-
consuming,o it could still successfully limit the ability of licensed therapists to
engage in SOCE practices. First of all, if sufficient complaints were brought
against SOCE practitioners, the California Board of Psychology might be
galvanized to issue a formal regulation clarifying that SOCE is prohibited (for
deceptiveness reasons) under the state's rules of professional conduct.
Furthermore, the vast majority of SOCE therapists are generally affiliated with
186. See id.
187. Adam G. Slote, ADMIN. L.: Bus. & PROF. LICENSES (last updated Oct. 20, 2009), http://
www.licenselaw.com (describing options open to professionals facing de-licensing
proceedings in California); see also, e.g., Rand v. Bd. of Psychology, 142 Cal Rptr. 3d 288 (Ct.
App. 2012) (affirming a trial court's denial of a psychologist's application for a writ of
administrative mandamus challenging a Board of Psychology decision revoking his license).
188. Conversion Therapy, supra note 12.
189. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, supra note 185 (emphasis added).
19o. This problem is discussed further infra Section III.D.
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larger organizations 9' (of which JONAH and NARTH are examples) and
several targeted and successful license revocation proceedings against members
of these organizations might be able to quickly destabilize the broader network
and infrastructure of SOCE practitioners.
C. Benefits ofan Anti-Deception Approach
Some of the benefits of curtailing SOCE through a general anti-deception
regime - rather than targeted legislation like SB 1172- are obvious. While some
liberal states seem poised to pass legislation like SB 1172,19' most states,
especially those with poor records on LGB rights, are unlikely to follow suit.
Using existing anti-deception statutes of general applicability would allow LGB
rights groups to target SOCE practitioners even in states that would never pass
targeted SOCE bans, or in states where legislative efforts are moving too
slowly. Even in states that do not yet have rules of professional conduct as
robust as California's (namely, statutes that prohibit therapists from engaging
in deceptive advertising or from making unrealistic promises to patients), it
would likely be far easier to convince legislatures to pass general anti-deception
statutes than to pass a targeted SOCE ban. Even legislators who might hesitate
to support an overt anti-SOCE ban would likely feel comfortable opposing
quack psychological practices generally. 193
But even in states that might be willing to pass a targeted ban like SB 1172,
it could still be advisable to use an anti-deception regime to curtail SOCE. As
the remainder of this Section argues, such an anti-deception approach would
not suffer from the normative and political-strategic problems that plague the
SB 1172 approach.
191. The Southern Poverty Law Center maps the locations of SOCE practitioners. It shows that
most are associated with larger groups like NARTH. Conversion Therapy, supra note 12.
192. See sources cited supra note 17 (describing ongoing legislative efforts in Pennsylvania, New
York, and Massachusetts).
193. Indeed, such a regime could curtail other potentially deceptive types of psychotherapy. For
example, some psychologists have argued that many practitioners of eye movement
desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) therapy vastly overstate the therapy's efficacy
when "not a shred of good evidence exists that EMDR is superior to exposure-based
treatments that behavior and cognitive-behavior therapists have been administering
routinely for decades." Scott 0. Lilienfeld & Hal Arkowitz, EMDR: Taking a Closer Look,
Scl. AM., Jan. 3, 20o8, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=emdr-taking-a
-closcr-look.
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1. This Approach Does Not Require the State to Adopt and Impose
Definitions of Sexual Identity
The proposals described above -which would limit SOCE practices under
a broader regulatory regime-would allow the state to avoid adopting a
categorizing and essentializing conception of LGB identity like the kind used
by SB 1172. Indeed, a deception-oriented scheme would not require the
legislature to adopt any definition of sexual orientation at all. Such a regime
would therefore not preclude a therapist from engaging fully with patients who
may conceive of their sexual orientation in more fluid or shifting terms (like
the hypothetical lesbian-identified but possibly bisexual woman described
above).' 94 A deception-oriented regime would not suffer from such collateral
effects because it would, implicitly, only be capable of targeting therapists who
intend to attempt to "convert" a client from gay to straight (namely, those who
affirmatively advertise that they are able to change a patient's sexual
orientation in therapy or those who make unrealistic promises to a same-sex-
oriented person about the efficacy of SOCE practices).s95 In contrast, a
therapist who simply seeks to help a patient with an ambiguous sexual identity
sort out his feelings'96 -but does not hold herself out as having the power to
actively diminish same-sex attraction or increase opposite-sex attraction-
would not be affected. In this respect, such a regime would likely encompass
only the type of therapists who seem to have been of greatest concern to the
drafters of SB 1172: those who actively attempt (most often due to some kind of
ideological opposition to same-sex sexual behavior)197 to alter the sexual
194. See supra Section II.A. It is important to note that the deceptiveness argument does not
assume that a person can never organically reevaluate his or her avowed sexual orientation.
Indeed, as explained above, some people experience their sexuality in fluid terms over the
course of their lifetime. See supra Section II.A. Rather, this argument assumes that same-sex
sexual attraction- which we would commonly label homosexuality- cannot actively be altered
through psychotherapeutic intervention. See supra Section III.A. As explained further below,
this distinction is important because it means that an anti-deception regime would
implicitly only target therapists who actively intend to try to alter the feelings of those who
experience same-sex attraction.
195. The intent described here is not true intent to defraud, of the kind required by New Jersey's
commercial code, see supra note 137. Rather, it is simply the intent to convince others that
sexual orientation can be changed, despite the lack of supporting scientific evidence.
196. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying discussion (describing the hypothetical problems
posed by SB 1172 for a non-SOCE therapist seeking to counsel a lesbian patient who
describes growing heterosexual attraction).
197. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 154-155.
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attraction of individuals who otherwise recognize that they are sexually
oriented toward people of the same sex.'9
Furthermore, a deception-oriented approach would not require the state to
normalize, through legislation, its assumptions about different "categories" of
sexual orientation or about whether sexual orientation should be thought of as
constitutive of an individual's sense of self.199 As legislation of general
applicability, anti-deception legislation would not require the legislature to
iterate any definitions of sexual orientation at all. In this respect, this approach
would not contribute to marginalizing those who do not conceive of sexual
orientation in mainstream terms.200
The proposal described above is, in some ways, consistent with recent
arguments in antidiscrimination law that have focused on adopting
universalized, rather than group-specific, policies, in order to avoid using state
power to define a group's identity. In the LGB context, Sonia Katyal has
argued that LGB civil rights groups should focus on a more universalized
conception of "sexual autonomy," rather than a group-based conception that
emphasizes "equality" between the LGB minority and the heterosexual
majority, in order to avoid marginalizing those who fall outside of conventional
conceptions of sexual orientation."o' Under a sexual autonomy framework,
which emphasizes the right of all people to define their sexuality free from state
coercion, "no particular 'sexual orientation' or 'naming' is required for
inclusion." 20 2 Kenji Yoshino has pointed out that this type of argument may
weigh in favor of greater reliance on an individualized conception of liberty
19s. The Ferguson v. JONAH plaintiffs present a useful example. These men all experienced
same-sex attraction (of the kind that would generally lead someone to identify as gay) but
sought therapy from SOCE practitioners who claimed they could limit this same-sex
attraction and/or instill heterosexual attraction through SOCE methods. See supra notes 130-
135 and accompanying text.
199. See discussion supra Section II.A.
200. A specific administrative de-licensing proceeding against a SOCE therapist, see supra
Subsection III.B.4, may require some discussion of what defines sexual orientation. For
example, in order to make a finding that a SOCE therapist engaged in deceptive advertising
and/or acted outside his competence, an administrative law judge would presumably need
to accept that the patient bringing the allegation maintains a certain identifiable sexual
orientation and that that orientation is fixed at least insofar as the SOCE therapist could not
possibly have changed it through direct psychotherapeutic intervention. But this type of
case-by-case "labeling" is very different than imposing a set of assumptions ex ante using
legislation.
201. Katyal, supra note 76, at 172.
202. Id.; see also supra notes 76-80.
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(under the Due Process Clause) over a group-oriented conception of equality
(under the Equal Protection Clause) in assessing equal rights claims brought
by members of minority groups. 203 The regulation of SOCE does not
necessarily touch on the Court's equal protection jurisprudence, but the
distinction between individual-oriented and group-oriented approaches is
nonetheless relevant. By framing the state's regulation of SOCE as stemming
from everyone's interest in being free from deceptive psychological practices
(rather than as an issue that is only relevant to LGB people), the proposal
described above would accomplish the same goals as SB 1172 while allowing the
state to avoid defining "gays, lesbians, and bisexuals" as a concrete and
cohesive group.
2. This Approach Would Not Lead to Substantial First Amendment
Litigation
While the approach of SB 1172 engages directly with the complicated
question of how much protection the First Amendment affords to "professional
speech,"2 0 4 an anti-deception approach would be on far more secure First
Amendment ground. This would be true regardless of whether SOCE was
targeted using an approach focused on regulating deceptive advertising, one
focused on regulating unrealistic promises made in the course of therapy,
or both.
Fraudulent or deceptive advertising is widely considered to be outside the
scope of the First Amendment, and the government may ban such speech.20
The FTC, for example, routinely censures corporations that deceptively or
misleadingly advertise that their products can provide certain benefits.20
Despite the continuing erosion of the "commercial speech" doctrine-the
notion that regulation of any speech made in the course of a commercial
transaction is held to a lower standard of First Amendment review- in recent
203. Yoshino, supra note 75, at 795 (pointing out that an "advantage of liberty-based dignity
analysis is that it is less likely to essentialize identity").
204. See discussion supra Section II.B.
205. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
("The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than
to inform it.").
206. See, e.g., Complaint, In re KFC Corp., 138 F.T.C. 422 (2004) (No. C-4118) (bringing action
against Kentucky Fried Chicken for stating in its advertisements that the consumption of
fried chicken can be compatible with certain weight loss programs).
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years,2o7 the general assumption that the state may prohibit fraudulent or
misleading advertising seems to be secure.20 Therefore, a regime that censures
licensed psychologists who make deceptive or misleading claims about the
effectiveness of their therapies would likely pass First Amendment muster.
Indeed, as explained above,20 precisely such a regime already exists in
California. To my knowledge, it has never been challenged on First
Amendment grounds.
Prohibiting a therapist from directly (rather than solely through
advertising) making unrealistic promises about a treatment's efficacy, outside
the scope of his professional competence, would also be unlikely to offend the
First Amendment. As explained in the last Part,2 0 a speech restriction that is
incidental to the regulation of the professional conduct of state-licensed
professionals is generally not considered to be a free speech restriction at all.2 11
For this reason, the state may censure a doctor who withholds a diagnosis
without violating the First Amendment.' The last Part explained that,
notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's decision to uphold SB 1172, a ban of any
form of SOCE does not obviously fall within the regulation of professional
conduct because of the lack of clinical evidence that SOCE is per se harmful.
207. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (holding that a Vermont statute
regulating the marketing of drugs by pharmaceutical manufacturers triggered heightened
scrutiny under the First Amendment notwithstanding its commercial nature).
208. See, e.g., id. at 2658 (stating that had the statute in question been related to regulating "false
or misleading speech" it would have easily survived a First Amendment challenge). But cf
Kathryn E. Gilbert, Note, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center Regulations and
Definitions of Commercial Speech, iII MICH. L. REv. 591, 594 (2013) (pointing out that courts
have begun striking down ordinances designed to regulate "crisis pregnancy centers"-
centers that counsel women to forgo abortions but often use deceptive advertising practices
to imply that they offer abortions -on First Amendment grounds). While ordinances such
as those Gilbert discusses often entail compelling speech-namely, requiring that crisis
pregnancy centers disclose the limitations of their services-and thus are not directly on
point, these cases may portend a troubling attack on the state's ability to regulate misleading
speech in advertising.
209. See supra Subsection III.B.i.
210. See supra Section II.B.
211. See, e.g., Nat'1 Ass'n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228
F.3d 1043, 1054 (9 th Cir. 2000) (holding that the requirements of California's psychological
licensing scheme do not implicate the First Amendment because "employ[ing] speech to
treat [] clients does not entitle [psychoanalysts], or their profession, to special First
Amendment protection").
212. Post, supra note 94, at 951-53.
213. See supra Sections I.B, II.B.
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But a regime focused only on prohibiting a therapist from making unrealistic
promises about his ability to "cure" conditions that the mental health
establishment does not consider curable (such as non-heterosexual sexual
attraction) could more easily fall under the general regulation of professional
conduct, 14 and thus not implicate the First Amendment. As the preceding
Section explained, California already prohibits a therapist from " [p] erforming,
holding himself or herself out as being able to perform, or offering to perform
any professional services beyond the scope of . .. his or her field or fields of
competence," 1 a regulation that may encompass prohibiting therapists from
promising or attempting to "treat" conditions that are not considered treatable.
This provision would seem to be a pure regulation of professional conduct,
outside the scope of the First Amendment.1 6
3. This Approach Would Be Less Politically Contentious Since It Avoids
Implicating a "Parental Rights" Narrative
Finally, a deception-oriented approach carries less risk of fomenting
extreme political backlash, as compared to the SB 1172 approach. Embedding
the regulation of SOCE in a universal anti-deception regime would make it far
harder for SOCE proponents to argue that the state is "privileging" LGB
concerns over the rights 17 (especially the parental rights) of other Americans.
There are simply few politically appealing arguments against the state
regulating deceptive promises made by therapists; after all, few people-gay or
straight -want to be duped into paying for ineffective treatments.
Granted, targeting SOCE practitioners using a broader anti-deception
regime could prove politically contentious, especially as anti-LGB activists
begin to realize this strategy has been adopted and attempt to respond. Indeed,
214. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (explaining that, under the APA's general ethical
guidelines, psychologists are expected to perform or hold themselves out as being able to
perform services that fall within their field of competence, as based on the "established
scientific and professional knowledge of the discipline").
215. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4989.54(r) (West 2013); see also id. 5§ 4982(S), 4992.3(m),
4999-90(s) (imposing similar restrictions on other professions).
216. Cf Nat'lAss'nfor the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1047, 1053-55 (upholding the
constitutionality of California's licensing scheme for psychoanalysts, including the
requirement that psychoanalysts not imply to patients that they are "licensed to practice
psychology," under the theory that this scheme only regulates professional conduct and
therefore does not implicate the First Amendment).
217. See supra Section II.C.
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using the administrative agencies or courts to curtail SOCE could even provide
anti-SOCE activists with a powerful argument that SOCE opponents are
employing unaccountable fora to achieve a result that should be left to the
legislature.
While this backlash could certainly prove damaging to LGB-rights causes,
there is reason to believe it would be less extreme than the kind of backlash
that has already begun to emerge in response to SB 1172. As argued above, the
history of the "no promo homo" anti-LGB discourse in America, coupled with
the powerful public values in favor of leaving child-rearing decisions in the
hands of parents, makes the optics of SB 1172 especially dangerous. By, at least
superficially, appearing to privilege gay rights over the "rights" of parents to
control their children's upbringing, SB 1172 plays into a particularly vicious and
powerful anti-LGB narrative.211 While an anti-deception approach would be
open to attack by more traditional tools of political discourse (such as
accusations of countermajoritarianism), opponents would find it much harder
to employ the powerful "no promo homo" narrative that has successfully
galvanized anti-LGB sentiment in the past and is already being used against
SB 1172.
D. Objections
As explained above, the process of bringing SOCE practices under the
auspices of a non-SOCE-specific anti-deception regime could be slow.2 1 9 At
least in California, individual complainants would need to challenge SOCE
practitioners on a case-by-case basis, arguing that SOCE practices can be
considered misconduct under the existing California Code of Professional
Conduct provisions that restrict engaging in deceptive advertising or practices
that fall outside a psychologist's "competence.> 2 2 o This process could gradually
lead to the de-licensing of most major SOCE practitioners and might even
galvanize the state Board of Psychology to use its rulemaking authority to
clearly establish that SOCE runs afoul of the state's code of professional
conduct. 2 ' Either way, this case-by-case approach could, in effect, achieve the
desired outcome of targeted ban like SB 1172.
218. See supra Section II.C.
2ig. See supra Subsection III.B.4.
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Proponents of exclusive use of the SB 1172 strategy might counter that a
case-by-case an approach would be problematic for several reasons. First, at
least in California, this approach would require convincing administrative law
judges, on a case-by-case basis, that SOCE qualifies as deceptive or is outside
the scope of a psychologist's competence under the California code of
professional conduct.m' While some judges might be receptive to this
argument, others might not be. Legislation like SB 1172 avoids this problem by
unequivocally establishing that the use of SOCE practices on minors can
provide grounds for de-licensing.
Proponents of the SB 1172 approach might also focus on the secondary
public relations benefits that targeted, high-profile legislation can have. As the
sponsor of SB 1172 explained during proceedings surrounding the legislation,
the goal of the bill is not simply to ban the use of SOCE on minors, but "to
provide awareness of the alternatives to and the potential harmful effects of
sexual orientation change therapies."2 Indeed, the SB 1172 approach arguably
presents a better strategy for challenging the homophobia and prejudice that
lurks behind SOCE directly. A case-by-case approach of de-licensing SOCE
practitioners would probably not attract the kind of high-profile attention that
SB 1172 has received and, in this respect, would be less effective in raising
awareness about SOCE patients' experiences.
While these concerns are valid, they do not necessarily overwhelm the
benefits an anti-deception approach offers compared to the SB 1172 approach.
First of all, concerns about the slow pace of targeted de-licensing actions may
be exaggerated. As Section III.A explained, there is consensus among the
mental health establishment that SOCE is ineffective and that promises made
by SOCE practitioners to "cure" homosexuality have no grounding in scientific
studies. In this respect, there are few barriers to demonstrating, in the course of
proceedings against a SOCE practitioner, that any promises made by the
therapist regarding the efficacy of her treatments were misleading and
potentially provide grounds for license revocation.
Furthermore, as Subsection III.B.4 explained, most SOCE practitioners are
affiliated with a relatively small number of larger organizations- such as
JONAH and NARTH-which provide training, resources, and a support
network. This means that several targeted de-licensing proceedings might
222. Id. (describing how the process of de-licensing a mental health professional in California
culminates with a hearing before an administrative law judge).
223. S. RuLES COMM., OFFICE OF S. FLOOR ANALYSES, S.B. 1172: THIRD READING, 2d Sess., at 4
(Cal. May 25, 2012).
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quickly destabilize these larger organizations " thereby undermining the
broader infrastructure of SOCE practitioners. Additionally, as soon as some
have been de-licensed for professional misconduct, individual SOCE
practitioners might recognize that continuing to engage in their practices
would likely eventually lead to legal action and question whether that risk is
worth taking.
Second, while the potential public relations and educational benefits of
high-profile legislation like SB 1172 is likely to be greatest, a targeted and
successful de-licensing campaign against SOCE practitioners might also attract
some media attention. The strategy of the Southern Poverty Law Center in the
JONAH case, described above, seems to be based on the assumption that
individuated litigation can help raise awareness about the experiences of SOCE
patients." Indeed, the JONAH case has already attracted significant media
attention.226 Furthermore, the fact that an anti-deception approach might
curtail SOCE without attracting large amounts of public attention may in fact
make it a more appealing option in states that are generally more hostile to
LGB-rights causes.
Indeed, it is important to emphasize that SOCE opponents could pursue a
targeted-ban approach and an anti-deception approach concurrently. As
explained above, the anti-deception approach may be most appealing in states
224. The recent and sudden closure of Exodus International, a large "ex-gay" organization,
provides an interesting case study in how consistent criticism and controversy can weaken a
SOCE-espousing organization. See Billy Hallowell, Exodus Leader Explains Why Gay
Ministry Is Ending Its 'War with the Culture' and Details 'God's Creative Intent for Sexuality,'
BLAzE, June 21, 2013, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2o13/o6/21/exodus-leader-explains
-why-gay-ministry-is-ending-its-war-with-the-culture-and-details-gods-creative-intent-for
-sexuality (explaining that growing realization of the organization's "negative impact"
contributed to its decision to close); see also Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Ex-Gay Group Exodus
International Shuts Down, President Apologizes, RELIGIONs NEWS SERVICE, June 20,
2013, http://www.religionnews.coM/2O3/o6/20/exodus-international-to-shut-down-after
-presidents-apology-to-gay-community (quoting former president Alan Chambers as saying
that Exodus's espousal of "reparative therapy was one of the things that led to the downfall
of this organization").
225. See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying discussion.
226. See, e.g., Alan Duke, Gay Men Sue Counselors Who Promised to Make Them Straight, CNN,
Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2ol2/11/27/us/conversion-therapy-lawsuit; Erik
Eckholm, Gay 'Conversion Therapy' Faces Test in Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2ol2/11/28/us/gay-conversion-therapy-faces-tests-in-courts.html;
Susan Donaldson James, Gay Men, Moms Sue NJ Jewish Gay Conversion Therapists,
ABC NEWS, Nov. 27, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/nj-lawsuit-alleges-jonah-gay
-conversion-therapy-fraud/story?id= 17814302.
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that are simply unlikely to pass targeted bans, since the anti-deception
approach involves pursuing SOCE practitioners using administrative
procedures, courts, and politically safer statutes of general applicability.22 The
SB 1172 strategy could remain the favored option in the few liberal states that
seem willing to consider such legislation. Thus, while this Note has expressed
reservations about the SB 1172 approach, those arguments should not forestall
the potential benefits of an anti-deception approach even for those who
continue to favor the pursuit of targeted SOCE bans.
This Part's argument may also point to a broader claim: that proponents of
specific causes should be more willing to harness laws of general applicability
to achieve goals that cannot (or should not) be sought through targeted
legislation. This Part has focused on statutes that generally prohibit
psychotherapists from engaging in deceptive advertising or practices, pointing
out that such statutes could be used to curtail SOCE. Such an approach would
allow SOCE opponents to avoid the contentious issues of identity politics,
constitutional litigation, and anti-LGB sentiment that would emerge from
pursuing targeted bans. In this respect, this strategy might also be advisable in
other politically contentious areas."' For example, some have argued that
environmental activists should bring common law nuisance claims against
corporations that emit high levels of greenhouse gases, instead of or in addition
to targeted legislative efforts,2 though this approach has proven challenging
in the courts. 230 While a full discussion of the broader benefits and implications
227. See discussion supra Section III.C.
228. Cf, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 75, at 794 (arguing that, in the constitutional
antidiscrimination realm, appealing to general liberty claims under the Due Process Clause
is more effective than specialized group-based claims under the Equal Protection Clause
because liberty-based arguments "frame[] the right at a high enough level of generality that
[all citizens] are urged to imagine a world in which they were denied the right").
229. See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing
Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a "Global Warming Solution" in California, 40 CONN. L.
REv. 591 (2008) (suggesting this strategy); David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in
the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1745 (2007)
(same); Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public Nuisance and
Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1827 (2008) (same); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Global
Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 (2005) (exploring challenges
posed by this approach). See generally Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About
Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 n.3 (2011) (outlining the vast academic literature on tort law and
climate change).
230. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (holding that the Clean
Air Act displaces any nuisance claim brought against greenhouse gas emitters under federal
common law, but holding open the option that such claims could potentially be brought
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of using laws of general applicability to pursue social change is outside the
scope of the Note, there are clearly strong arguments in favor of using this
approach at least in the specific case of regulating sexual orientation change
efforts.23
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that there are limitations to the SB 1172 strategy of
using targeted legislation to ban therapists from engaging in "any practices ...
that seek to change a[] [minor] individual's sexual orientation."23 ' Even those
opposed to SOCE should recognize that adopting the SB 1172 approach in
other states could collaterally affect people who do not conceive of their sexual
identities in mainstream terms, could generate contentious constitutional
litigation relating to the First Amendment status of professional speech, and
could foster political backlash by playing into a rhetorically powerful narrative
that sees LGB rights as antithetical to the strong public values in favor of
parental control over a child's upbringing.
This Note has also proposed an alternative approach that might be used to
achieve the goals of SB 1172 without succumbing to the criticisms raised above.
Such an approach would involve crafting-or using existing- legislation that
restricts therapists from making deceptive claims in advertising their services,
or from making promises or engaging in practices that defy the mainstream
understanding of what psychotherapy is capable of accomplishing.
Considering that the mental health establishment has come to the consensus
that SOCE is ineffective in changing sexual orientation, and indeed that
homosexuality is not something that can be "cured" to begin with, SOCE could
potentially fall under the ambit of this type of anti-deception regime of general
applicability. Though regulating SOCE under such a regime might prove
slower and more complex, this approach would carry far fewer normative,
constitutional, and political-strategic concerns, making it a compelling strategy
going forward.
under state common law in the limited situations in which state law is not preempted);
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), af'd,
696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissing federal common law nuisance claim on political
question doctrine and standing grounds).
231. See discussion supra Section III.C.
232. S.B. 1172 § 2(b)(1), 2011-12 S., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 865(b)(1) (West 2013)).
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